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ABSTRACT
During an election cycle, social media newsfeeds and TV screens are overrun with
political advertisements and celebrity politics. Publicity has become a critical component of
presidential elections. While many argue that a reliance on publicity developed with the
popularization of the television, I argue that a dependency on publicity occurred in the early-tomid 1900’s with three publicity experts who paved the way for future elections. Robert Woolley
in Woodrow Wilson’s 1916 campaign exercised unprecedented management over his publicity
bureau and used new techniques catering to new mediums of the time; Albert Lasker in Warren
Harding’s 1920 campaign merged the business of advertising into the world of politics and sold
Harding like he would sell a product; and Charles Michelson in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1932
campaign conducted one of the biggest mudslinging campaigns to date, demonstrating the
foundations for the smear-style campaign that is all too common in modern elections. These
three men played transitional roles in the origination of modern political publicity as campaigns
evolved into candidate-centric contests of showmanship and personality. Their contributions to
the field are still present today.

iv

INTRODUCTION
The nineteenth century political culture in America consisted of unwavering party loyalty
and backroom deals. Presidential campaigns were a vessel for strong partisan display, as voters
would gather in rallies and parades with fireworks, full of excitement. The results of the
presidential elections in the 1800’s were “undemocratic” as major decisions were made privately
by political elites, but candidates still required “the visible endorsement of the people” through
rich partisan celebration. 1 These public demonstrations of support provided a sense of belonging
for Americans, and this period was a political “golden age” with interest among voters and voter
participation at a high. 2 While presidential elections throughout the nineteenth century were, in
essence, a proud “ritual of partisan display,” the candidates themselves remained seemingly
absent and unknown throughout the campaign process.3
Two-hundred years later in the twenty-first century a much different political culture
exists. The recent 2016 presidential election exemplified how much personality matters in a
desirable candidate. Publicity tactics and showmanship are key determinants for victory in
modern elections. The winning candidate received overwhelming media coverage as he took to
social media to smear his opponents and directly appeal to the voters.4 Presidential candidates
and their campaign teams have mastered the art of appealing to voters through publicity. The
evolution from nineteenth-century campaigning with an absent candidate and strong party ties to
twenty-first century campaigning with an active candidate and celebrity politics has been gradual
but constant.
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***
With the beginning of the twentieth century came a decrease in voter turnout. 5 Party ties
loosened and people no longer felt as though political parties provided the sense of community
they had in the past. Admirable candidates of the people turned into power-seeking politicians,
and there was a growing sense of political apathy among Americans. Between 1880-1930
America developed into a consumer-based capitalist “land of desire” driven by profit, aesthetics
and tangible commodities. 6 From 1860-1910 the urban population in America multiplied by
seven.7 Improved communications linked cities into modern, centralized networks. Political
parties and the press underwent liberal reforms, and the partisan-community mindset was
abandoned. Political managers sensed a growing need for something new to grab people’s
attention. Thus, the early stages of modern political publicity began to take form.
With the new era of political campaigning came the critical role of publicity experts to
shape the candidate’s image so to appear as the ideal candidate for the American people. Public
relations became a profession in the early 1900’s, and publicity became less about full disclosure
of facts and more about selective, bias persuasion. 8 Further, Americans developed “extravagant
expectations” that can be filled only by extravagant images and gestures. 9 Politics without flare
was considered a bore. Technological advancements brought the radio and motion picture films
providing new mediums by which candidates would campaign as they were now able to be seen
and heard by the masses.
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Three publicity experts working on separate presidential campaigns were transitional
figures in laying the foundations for the modern publicity show that is a presidential campaign
today. Robert Woolley on the 1916 Wilson campaign, Albert Lasker on the 1920 Harding
campaign and Charles Michelson on the 1932 Roosevelt campaign all had lasting impacts on the
campaigning process.
Robert Woolley ushered in a new era of political campaigning when he ran the publicity
for the Democratic National Committee during Woodrow Wilson’s 1916 presidential campaign.
Woolley had an entire publicity bureau on hand and exercised unprecedented press management.
He knew how to appeal to the mass voting audiences using new techniques and was an excellent
strategist who practiced extensive planning.
Albert Lasker brought professional advertising to the world of politics. He played a major
role in shaping modern advertising before being recruited by the Harding campaign for the 1920
election. He demonstrated how advertising techniques could be used to sell a candidate as he
appealed for votes in newsreels, billboards, advertisements and moving picture films. Lasker
used every medium at his disposal to humanize Harding and sell him as president of the United
States.
Charles Michelson was an editor, journalist and political publicist. In 1929, the
Democratic National Committee hired him as the first full-time publicity director, and in 1932 he
led Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) to victory. He was a ghost writer for hundreds of press releases
attacking Herbert Hoover’s campaign and perfected the art of political mudslinging. Michelson
was a yellow journalist who took demonizing one’s opponent to the next level in presidential
campaigns.

3

Few academics recognize the early twentieth century as the time when publicity became
essential to campaigns. Instead, a great deal of literature focuses on the later twentieth century
when television became popular. I dispute this. The elections of 1916, 1920 and 1932 show the
origination of publicity in candidate-centric campaigns that would manifest in future campaigns
as later decades saw new technological developments and opportunities. Further, within research
on presidential elections focus is less often given to the impact that behind-the-scenes publicity
experts had during this transitional time. Woolley, Lasker and Michelson were geniuses in their
field. They helped shaped campaigns during a critical time of loosened party ties and extravagant
expectations. Woolley, Lasker and Michelson all had individual contributions still visible in
campaigns today, and their efforts and legacy should not be overlooked.
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CHAPTER 1: PUBLICITY’S EVOLVING ROLE AT
THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
There is interposed between the voter and his final judgment the whole
mechanism of publicity
- The New Republic, 1920

Strong affiliation to political parties in the nineteenth century spurred voter turnout and
public participation. Party loyalty for Americans was a part of their identity, a “natural lens
through which to view the world,” Michael McGerr wrote in his literature on the declining role
of political parties.10 McGerr noted that this was a very subjective manner of perception, as fact
and opinion blended to where there was little distinction between the two. 11 This intense
partisanship was transferred into what was known as spectacular campaigning involving
torchlight parades, street rallies, decorative banners and campaign buttons to support the
candidate of one’s party. These party loyalists “seldom compared party platforms” and rarely
“weighed the relative merits of candidates before casting their ballots.” 12 Newspapers in the early
nineteenth century were communication vessels for the political parties who “funded and
operated” most of the national newspapers. 13
Penny papers, papers sold daily for one penny on street corners, entered American
society in 1833 causing a “revolution in American journalism.”14 Penny papers were the first
challenger to party-run papers. These penny papers created a “growing emphasis on news and a
growing intolerance for blind party loyalty” that continued to build throughout the nineteenth
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century.15 By the end of the Civil War, the press had gained more influence among the American
public. While newspapers originally served as mouthpieces for the political parties, “growing
circulation” led the newspaper business to become “less dependant” on the parties. 16 This did not
mean that the press was absent of partisan displays, only that they were not under the direct
control of political parties. The press still took strong political stances and received funding from
the parties. Newspapers and political leaders entered a new era of co-dependence, an age of
partisan journalism.
Partisan papers became an excellent medium for mass political promotion. Republicanleaning papers would criticize Democratic candidates, if they even mentioned them at all which
they often neglected to do and vice versa.17 Days leading up to polling, Republican papers
described Republican rallies as “monster meetings” while not even covering the Democratic
rallies.18 The Democratic papers did the same. At this point in time, presidential candidates were
still fairly unknown to the public.
Newspapers as a medium continued to grow throughout the late nineteenth century. With
the growing demand for news came pressures for “new ways for papers to address the public.” 19
Many journalists and papers underwent liberal reform and began to challenge partisan
journalism. Additionally, advertising became more important for businesses as the consumerbased capitalist culture continued to develop in America. A popular place for advertisements
were newspapers, the key mass medium of the time. As more businesses continued to buy
advertisement space, the less newspapers had to rely on political parties for funding. 20 With
Rutenbeck, “Toward a history of the ideologies,” 131.
Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 189.
17
Michael Schudson, “Objectivity norm in American journalism,” Journalism 2, no. 2 (August 2001): 149-170.
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challenges to the partisan-style press and a growing advertising revenue as an alternate source of
funding, the press became more independent. An independent press created a more complex
political world for voters as they now lacked the roadmap that the previous partisan press had
offered. Politics was, to some degree, “less accessible” as Americans now had to think about
political decisions on their own. 21 Campaigns needed a more public candidate as well as original
methods to persuade the free-thinking American people.
Party Reform
In the final decades of the nineteenth century, liberal reform groups gained influence in
America limiting the parties’ role in political change. Liberal groups promoted reform for a
number of issues such as tariff, municipal, ballot legislation and probably the best known, civil
service reform. Civil service reform groups advocated that government positions be appointed
based on merit rather than political affiliation. By advocating for government reform, liberal
groups influenced Americans to reject “unquestioning partisanship.” 22 McGerr noted that while
most liberal groups were unsuccessful in their attempts, their reform efforts “helped to transform
the political style” at the end of the nineteenth century, as they represented attempts to
“transcend partisan politics.”23 At the same time, newspapers were becoming more independent
and distancing from their previous role as mouthpieces of the parties.
For the majority of the nineteenth century, political parties had provided the “only feasible
means” for organizing campaigns and elections. 24 By the end of the century, party ties had
loosened but the need for parties remained, and a change in the function of the party relative to

21
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the people occurred. While in the golden age of political parties, the party was “more important
than the people in it,” reforms led to the more modern idea that the party is the people in it.25
The Election of 1896
In the 1896 presidential election, currency was the primary topic of debate as America
was just getting over the Panic of 1893, which had depleted America’s gold reserves and
bankrupted over 15,000 businesses.26 The Democratic party nominated former Nebraska
Congressman William Jennings Bryan as their candidate, and the Republican Party nominated
Ohio Governor William McKinley. While Bryan advocated the platform of the “Bimetallic
Democrats” who wanted “free silver” and gold, McKinley and the Republican party proposed an
economy based on a gold standard.27 The election was promoted as the “battle of the
standards.”28 Currency was a new political issue, and framing the election around this topic
“placed unprecedented demands on party managers.” 29 The candidates were campaigning in
more states than ever before, and the number of people that needed to be “reached, educated and
convinced” was unprecedented.30 However, as the parties had lost the partisan loyalty of
newspapers, candidates and their teams could no longer rely on the press to promote their
campaigns. Party organizations worked tirelessly to distribute content created by the national
committees as material was needed at a never-before-seen rate. Further, the 1896 election
marked a new trend toward “greater public activity by the presidential candidates.” 31 For the first
time, both major candidates had to play an active role in their campaigns.

25
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Bryan became a national figure almost overnight with his appeals for, and defense of, the
common man. While he was not particularly organized with his campaign and had little funding,
he had a magnetic presence and “immeasurable energy.” 32 Bryan was able to draw continuous
press coverage and he attracted constant attention from the public. His approach had an
“appealing and unprecedented directness” of communicating directly with the people. 33 By the
end of his campaign, Bryan had traveled 18,000 miles by train and delivered over 600
speeches.34 William McKinley on the other hand provided a sharp contrast to the ambitious, bold
Bryan. McKinley was traditional and safe. He ran a more low-key front-porch campaign from his
home in Canton, Ohio. Despite the low-key nature of his campaign style, McKinley’s team sent
out millions of pamphlets and deployed hundreds of speakers; the amount of money spent on
these efforts would be unmatched by either party until the election of 1920. 35
Bryan’s campaign started off quick and powerful while McKinley’s front-porch
campaign took more of a slow start. “Despite McKinley’s desire to be a traditional candidate
who waited in silence for the nation’s decision,” people had been exposed to Bryan, a candidate
who broadcasted his personality, and now expected no less from McKinley. 36 People showed up
to his home in Ohio, and McKinley was forced to show his face and directly appeal to the
masses. With the help of his campaign manager, Mark Hanna, who understood the importance of
actively campaigning, McKinley won the election.
Prior to the election of 1896, it was customary for candidates to stay for the most part out
of sight and let “surrogates” campaign on their behalf. 37 The 1896 election was the beginning of

32
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Americans feeling like they could really relate to the candidates and connect with them.
Historian Gil Troy wrote that candidates were no longer distant national icons, but a familiar face
about whom the public would know everything “from his shoe size to his world view.” 38 With
this election, presidential candidates were now “capitulated into the campaign.” 39 Directly
appealing to the voters and actively communicating with them collapsed the divide between
candidate and voter, and America entered the twentieth century with a new norm of candidates
playing a proactive role in their campaigns.
Turn of the Century and Teddy Roosevelt
The 1900 election brought a rematch between McKinley and Bryan, although this time
Theodore Roosevelt was the vice-presidential candidate. Teddy Roosevelt loved the spotlight
and was “as energetic a campaigner” as Bryan had been in the pivotal 1896 election. 40 He
traveled across the country giving speeches and mesmerizing audiences. Roosevelt “propelled
the presidential campaign” into the twentieth century as he was both a politician and a celebrity,
always loving his time in front of a crowd.41
After President McKinley was assassinated just six months into his second term, America
had “its first full-fledged celebrity” as president. 42 Teddy Roosevelt was “the twentieth century’s
first great publicist.”43 Fittingly, he became known as the “Publicity President.” 44 Roosevelt was
ambitious, strong-willed and transparent, making him a constant attraction for the press. He
made his presidency about a direct relationship between the president and the people, and made
the role of president an active and public position. Roosevelt commanded public attention “by
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mastering the tools and techniques of persuasion and image craft.” 45 In 1902, Teddy Roosevelt
gave his aide, George Cortelyou, the role of heading up all executive branch communications.
By doing so, Roosevelt established the beginnings of the White House press secretary position as
Cortelyou disseminated messages on Roosevelt’s behalf. 46 The job of a publicity expert was
becoming a more concrete profession in the world of politics.
In the 1904 election, Teddy Roosevelt ran for president against Alton B. Parker, Chief
Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. At the turn of the century, sensational journalism was
at an all-time high and Roosevelt knew that a candidate was now a publicity figure who “had to
entertain as well as educate.”47 The public was intrigued with details of both candidates’ personal
lives, and sensational newspapers attempted to feed their audience’s desires. Parker at one point
spoke out against the media-following that constantly surrounded him after photographs were
taken of him skinny dipping. The New York Sun in response to Parker claimed that “in this new
age of publicity,” a presidential candidate does not have the luxury of privacy.48 The Sun went on
to consider presidential candidates “public property,” therefore eliminating all barriers that had
previously limited journalists regarding a candidate’s personal life. 49
Roosevelt decided not to run for reelection in 1908. Instead, Roosevelt did everything in
his power to secure the nomination of someone he had worked closely with during his second
term, William Howard Taft. Taft was facing William Jennings Bryan, who was once again the
Democrat nominee. Taft was not fond of the spotlight and therefore began a quiet front-porch
campaign, as had been popular prior to the turn of the century. After multiple elections with an
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active and personable candidate, however, Taft’s front-porch campaign was not enough. Taft had
no choice but to begin an 18,000 mile, 400-speech tour across the United States. 50
Roosevelt remained by Taft’s side throughout the campaign. He was in Taft’s ear
constantly advising on how to showcase personality and cater to newspapers. Taft triumphed
over Bryan, but may not have without Roosevelt’s expertise. Further, Taft had tried to resort
back to a more private and secluded way of campaigning, but publicity and personality had
become too important by 1908. To be an absent candidate would have led to being a losing
candidate. During the first decade of the 1900’s, Teddy Roosevelt formed strong relationships
with reporters, and “developed practices to shape his messages and his image” that, once
implemented, became a critical part of campaigning. 51
The Election of 1912
By the 1912 election, people “demanded excitement,” leaving “unrealistic” expectations
of the candidates who now dealt with an overwhelming amount of media coverage and
publicity.52 While four candidates ran for office in the election of 1912, former president
Theodore Roosevelt, current president William Howard Taft, and New Jersey governor
Woodrow Wilson were the three frontrunners in an unprecedented three-way battle for the
presidency.
America was torn between Taft, the beloved incumbent Republican; Roosevelt, the
political celebrity of the last decade; and Wilson, the more quiet and unfamiliar yet appealing
Democratic governor. Taft and Roosevelt, fighting for the Republican nomination, spent as much
time attacking each other as they did campaigning on their own behalf. Taft eventually won the
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Republican nomination leading Roosevelt to found his own Progressive Party, and the threeparty race for the White House began.
The 1912 election was transitional for multiple reasons and exemplified “significant
alterations in how voters were now being wooed.” 53 Leading up to the 1912 election, a few
Western states had begun to adopt primaries, meaning greater demands on the candidates to
travel around the country and more speeches required to win over delegates. Newspapers reached
wider audiences “in a time before movies and radio had attained mass penetration,” and their
mass dissemination of election news was “the first signs” of how media innovations would
“affect national politics.”54
Wilson was a talented orator but did not like publicity and was “overwhelmed by the
demands of the press.”55 Taft was used to publicity and Roosevelt craved it. While Roosevelt
dominated the campaign scene in the beginning of the election, Woodrow Wilson realized the
strong influence that the media had, and that “personalities mattered.” 56 He adopted a more
active and personable approach to campaigning and attained increasing popularity to eventually
win the election. Victorious, President Wilson’s “emergence as an active candidate exemplified
the transformation” of a candidate. 57 While in the beginning of his campaign he was “aloof and
obsessed with dignity,” he soon realized what he needed to win and “learned how to appeal to
the people.”58
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The new age of media influence required candidates to “not only articulate” their ideas,
but “dramatize them.”59 Candidates who opted for a more quiet and passive approach to
campaigning learned quickly that this would not win them the White House. Power to elect a
candidate had transitioned away from party bosses and towards the people, who were now able
to participate in primaries. The transition from reliance on party to a mass people craving
personality and publicity came at the same time that public relations and publicity began to take
form as a legitimate profession. Strict party loyalty was a thing of the past, and the electorate was
now susceptible to persuasion based on mass appeals and publicity tactics.
The Role of the Publicity Expert
The start of the twentieth century saw the development of publicity experts who made a
business out of publicizing their candidate and persuading voters. As campaigns began placing a
“greater emphasis” on the candidates and their personalities, communication experts began
crafting messages using new technologies and mediums available to them. 60 Adam Sheingate
identified the turn of the century and Progressive Era reforms to be the time of transition when
politicians “embraced the idea of publicity” as an orchestrated “campaign of persuasion,”
dependent on “appeals to individual opinion” instead of partisan alignment.61
Progressive reforms, a growing independent press, as well as advertising revenues weakening
ties between newspapers and the parties led to an increase in the value of newspapers “as a
source of information.”62 Newspaper reach was unprecedented, but the parties no longer
controlled the information. What existed was an information void that needed to be filled by
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publicity agents. As media reach grew and technologies of the period continued to advance, new
methods for persuasion became available to campaign teams. With the newfound openness to the
idea of publicity to sell a presidential candidate, publicity experts of the early twentieth century,
starting with Robert Woolley, were able to create a foundation as the forerunners for political
publicity.
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CHAPTER 2: “YES OR NO, MR. HUGHES?”
May I say, too, that your publicity campaign is running circles
around any political publicity campaign that I have observed?
- Stillman H. Bingham to Robert Woolley, 191663
It is November 7, 1916. President Woodrow Wilson’s campaign team waits, exhausted
and anxious, for the results of the 33rd presidential election between Democratic incumbent,
Woodrow Wilson, and Republican candidate, Charles Evan Hughes. Well into the hours of the
night, Wilson’s men finally get word of their victory. Surrounded by cheers and screams, some
of the men grab the legs of Democratic National Committee Chairman Vance McCormick to
hoist him up in celebration. He stops them, points to the man across the room and says, “Grab
Bob Woolley! He is the man who won this election!” 64
***
The necessity for publicity in campaigns had been solidified in the first decade of the
twentieth century. The role of the publicity expert, however, one who could manipulate this
publicity in favor of their respective candidate, was still developing in response to the strong
demand for publicity. The 1912 election saw the first use of the motion picture for a campaign
advertisement. However, the use of this medium was still so new, and the election itself was
chaotic with four candidates running. Publicity was inconsistent and did not involve strategic
persuasion and manipulation of information as candidates simply did whatever they could to
stand out among the other three contenders. Woodrow Wilson did not even start actively
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campaigning until later in the election as he hated the idea of broadcasting oneself and public
speaking. By 1916, new mediums were more familiar in America and the candidates ready,
knowing the importance of good publicity. America was entering the phase of candidate-centric
campaigning, and Wilson needed an expert to pave the way.
The 1916 presidential election was between Democratic presidential incumbent
Woodrow Wilson and Republican Supreme Court Justice Charles Evan Hughes. Theodore
Roosevelt was also running for the Progressive Party, but he had lost traction since the 1912
election. “Bold innovations” to showcase their personalities were not only “acceptable” of the
candidates, “but necessary” in 1916. 65 After Republicans split their votes in the 1912 election
leading to an easy Democratic victory, re-election for Wilson was not guaranteed in 1916. The
1916 election happened in the midst of World War I. The United States was still neutral, and the
war was a major election issue as majority of Americans wanted to remain neutral. A large part
of Wilson’s image was his past record of, and intention to continue, keeping America out of the
war.
***
Robert Woolley was born in April 1871 in Lexington, Kentucky. He early on developed a
love for journalism and politics, both of which he would later learn to manipulate in his career.
His mother was an “earnest christian,” his father a newspaper correspondent turned farmer. 66 He
had three siblings: Charles, who became the news editor of the Wall Street Journal; Cicely, with
whom he had “ever been devoted and inseparable;” and his youngest sister Lucy. 67 In 1879, the
Woolley family moved to a six-bedroom home with a three-acre garden along the Harrodsburg
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Turnpike in Kentucky, and in 1880 he started at Miss Totten’s private school. As a boy he was
“keenly interested” in birds and woodcraft until around the age of five when his politics sparked
his interest.68
In 1876, when Robert Woolley was five years old, he helped collect material to start
bonfires in the street celebrating Samuel J. Tilden’s projected victory in the presidential election.
Tilden actually lost that election and, although at five years old Woolley “hadn’t the slightest
idea of what it was all about,” he recalled, “that incident marked the beginning of my interest in
politics.”69 Woolley’s interest continued to grow throughout his childhood. He would read
political news of the day in publications such as The Cincinnati Enquirer and The Louisville
Courier-Journal. His parents could not afford to send him away to college, so he took Latin and
Greek lessons under a college professor who was a friend of his father at what is now the
University of Kentucky. Soon after, Woolley’s grand aunt offered to send him to get an
education at Harvard University, but his aunt, a “devout Roman Catholic,” requested that he
allow her to pay for his education at St. John’s College instead, now known as Fordham
University.70 He finished third in his class in 1888 before having to return home to Kentucky for
poor health later that year. He then helped his father with farming their land until his father died
in 1891.
In 1895, Kentucky elected a Republican Governor for the first time in history. With this,
Woolley decided that “the time had come for me to move on.”71 Woolley left Kentucky for good
and went to Cleveland to be the editor for American Sportsman, a position he obtained after the
magazine noticed his reporting on harness races in Lexington and Nashville in the previous year.
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Two months before he turned twenty-five, Woolley became the sporting editor of The Chicago
Tribune, a job he kept for one year. Woolley did not like Chicago, but his year in Chicago was
the year of his “ political metamorphosis” as that is when he “became a liberal.”72 He went to the
Democratic National Committee Convention held in Chicago in 1896 and “if there was anything
wrong with the Democratic Party,” he admitted, “I didn’t want to know it.” 73 He then left for
New York City where he had a new job at The Evening Journal, before leaving soon after to
work for the sports department of The Morning World for a time. Around the turn of the century,
he moved to Washington D.C. to cover the House of Representatives for the World. Over the
course of the next decade, between the early 1900’s to 1911, Woolley worked for magazines,
papers and as a freelance journalist. In 1911, he became the chief investigator for the Stanley
Committee, a congressional committee that looked into the affairs of the U.S. Steel Corporation.
“The first time I saw Woodrow Wilson,” Woolley recalled, “he made the greatest
political speech I ever heard.” 74 Woolley had attended the Democratic Convention in Baltimore
as a freelance journalist following his work on the Stanley Committee. His work as a special
investigator for the Stanley Committee had deemed him as a trustworthy in Washington and so,
when Democratic National Committee publicity leader Frank B. Lord left the Democratic Party
National Headquarters to go run the Western Headquarters in 1912, Democratic leaders sought
out Woolley to be second-in-command for the Bureau of Publicity at the Democratic National
Committee.75 Woolley gained valuable experience working in the publicity bureau during the
1912 presidential election. Woolley’s boss, Chief of Publicity Josephus Daniels, would go home
to North Carolina often to be with his sick wife and son. In this time, Woolley would become the
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acting director of publicity for the Democratic National Committee. He was in charge of editing
the Democratic text book and condensed some of Wilson’s speeches so that Wilson could deliver
them in just six minutes. 76 He left the Bureau of Publicity to serve as director for the Mint from
1915-1916 before returning to the Democratic National Committee just in time for Wilson’s relection bid in 1916, this time running the show as director of publicity.
***
Literature on Robert Woolley is minimal. Gil Troy, in his book covering presidential
elections in American history with an emphasis on the growing need for publicity, marked the
1916 presidential election as when presidential campaigns fully took the form of spectacles to
please the “emerging leisure society” of consumers. 77 Troy noted that the 1916 election is when
publicity experts took a more definite role in the world of politics. “To harness modern culture’s
new technologies and rational techniques,” he wrote, candidates “turned to experts.” 78 Troy
mentioned Robert Woolley in his research on the 1916 election, stating that Woolley “recognized
that the new leisure-oriented society required a different kind of campaign.” 79 Troy credited
Woolley with being the brains behind a lot of the publicity that the Democratic National
Committee put out, a role that is often overlooked in campaign literature.
Lewis L. Gould wrote a comprehensive book on the 1916 election calling it the first
modern clash of power in America. 80 Gould recalled how the Democratic Party had to prevail
over negative notions existing in America about Wilson going into the election. He wrote that
Wilson’s victory was a surprise that left Hughes “bewildered.”81 Gould’s focus was on the
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“ideological consequences” that the 1916 election caused, as the two parties split down a “classbased” line.82 Robert Woolley is briefly mentioned in a paragraph, in which Gould considered
the publicity bureau, ran by Woolley, to have been a “particularly effective aspect of the
Democratic campaign.”83
As the above shows, there is little mention of Robert Woolley in literature on the 1916
election. Further, as stated in the introduction of this thesis, few works credit the early twentieth
century with being the time period in which publicity became a necessity. Existing literature
does not give Woolley the credit he deserves for the role he not only played in the 1916 election,
but the role he played as a key player in political publicity as it began to take modern form.
Woolley’s organization and construction of Wilson’s publicity in the 1916 presidential election
was unmatched by any campaign in American history.
***
Many people thought that if the Republican Party had not split in the 1912 election they
would have won since the Democrats were still the minority. So, Woolley viewed the 1916
election as the true test to see whether the Republican Party would prevail. In Woolley’s
unpublished autobiography, he wrote on the preparation for the 1916 campaign that
“emotionalism may prove to be a good political sprinter” but that organization was what is
needed “for the long pull.”84 He ran the Bureau of Publicity as if it were “the news department of
a metropolitan daily,” with organization being the epitome of his method and his tactical
management unprecedented. 85
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Woolley’s ability to manage and direct was unparalleled. He knew what tasks he needed
to delegate within his newspaper-like bureau and so created and oversaw many sub-departments.
The literary department prepared material such as Sunday newspaper features, plate matter and
“all special mail matter for the daily, weekly and monthly press” to be sent out. 86 There was a
department to create the Democratic text book for 1916 which included a managing editor. One
department created and distributed moving picture film advertisements. A business department
managed bids and contracts for circular and printed matter, while a shipping department was in
charge of distributing all of the printed pro-Wilson matter out from the campaign headquarters.
Woolley also established an advertising department, which he supervised directly as he wanted
to approve all advertising material that the bureau sent out.
Woolley surrounded himself with familiar and experienced news correspondents,
continuing to strategically run the bureau as if he were running a newspaper. He employed Earl
Harding of the New York World to be chief assistant in the literary department. He had known
Harding from Wilson’s 1912 campaign and wrote in a letter to Democratic National Committee
Chairman Vance McCormick, “I know his qualifications for the work to be exceptional.” 87
Woolley hired D. Hastings MacAdam to supervise the preparation of the Democratic campaign
text book. MacAdam was a Washington newspaper correspondent “with a wide reputation and
known ability.”88 Every hire was either a well-known journalist or someone who Woolley had
worked with personally on the 1912 campaign. As the need for more copy editors grew in the
literary department, Woolley continued to hire correspondents one by one. Only when “the
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campaign warmed up” did he feel that he needed more men to look after the daily newspaper
work.89
Woolley acknowledged early on in the campaign that a “most important branch of the
publicity work was to be that of looking after the agricultural publications,” as agriculture was a
big issue in the election. 90 He then hired a member of the Federal Farm Loan Board, Frank G.
Odell, for the post. Odell had previously been the editor of a leading farm paper in the West.
Odell worked with Harding of the literary department “in the preparation of the Farmers’
Pamphlet” and “revised all proofs of the text book articles pertaining to the farmer.” 91 Within
Woolley’s tightly managed, well-organized publicity department, he never brought on an
unneeded man or created an unnecessary position.
***
Having experience as a newspaper correspondent as well as experience on the 1912
Wilson campaign, Woolley knew what publications and advertisements to send out and when.
For example, Woolley knew that editors of newspapers and periodicals “generally were glad to
use signed matter, whereas frequently unsigned articles, though highly informative, went into the
waste basket.”92 Thus, Woolley hired George Creel to “get every writer of note” to “prepare one
or more statements as to why he or she was for the re-election of President Wilson.”93 These
statements, written as articles and signed, were then “eagerly taken” by the Newspaper
Enterprise Association and the United Press and then “given the widest publicity.” 94 Woolley
and his team prepared editorials and articles in newspaper format making it easy for the papers to
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take the material and add it to the daily papers. He had dozens of business cards and while some
were government-related, most of them were press contacts to whom he would send bureaucreated material.
As the director of publicity, Woolley had the task of creating new ways to appeal to the
public using every available medium in the leisure-oriented, consumer-based America. He began
a weekly bulletin newspaper, The Bulletin, with editorials, statistics and pro-Wilson
advertisements. Woolley issued The Bulletin every week until the week of the election. It was
sent to 8,500 newspapers around the country, as well as all Washington correspondents. 95
According to Robert Woolley, the “cartoon was never used to better advantage” than it
was in the 1916 campaign.96 His bureau distributed six or seven cartoons to over a thousand
major national newspapers weekly, until six weeks before the campaign when Woolley hired
cartoonist A.W. Scarborough to draw cartoons to send out daily. 97 The moving picture’s role in
the campaign came “second only to the newspapers.”98 One motion picture film titled, “The
President and His Cabinet in Action” was “so informative” and “its propaganda features were so
insidious” that Woolley and his publicity bureau were able to “have it distributed, without extra
cost, through the independent houses and through at least one of the great exchanges.” 99
Exchanges were the “middle men” for film distribution during this time. “Where Do You Go
from Here?” was a comedic film about Hughes and, while proved to be effective in certain parts
of the country, Woolley decided to pull the film from Connecticut and “use it sparingly” in the
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East as these states traditionally voted Republican, and he knew it would be less effective in this
area. 100
Woolley consulted two advertising agencies to assist in the placement of advertisements.
Taylor Critchfield Clague Co. of Chicago and Detroit assisted Woolley specifically in farm paper
advertisements. Hanff Metzger Company of New York helped with all other advertisements in
newspapers and in regular weekly and monthly periodicals. While the publicity bureau
distributed advertisements consistently throughout the campaign, Woolley believed they should
save their “heavy guns” until the end of the election, as this would provide a “strategical
advantage” in discrediting Hughes through paid matter while he toured across the country
making speeches. 101 This strategy resulted in the well-known Woolley-produced advertisement,
“Yes or No, Mr. Hughes?” With regard to both of Wilson’s opponents, Roosevelt and Hughes,
Woolley wrote that one of his immediate jobs was to “keep the two gentleman agitated, also
agitating each other.”102 Hughes ranked high among constituents, and Woolley knew that a
“partisan attack which impugned his political integrity, possibly even questioned the purity of his
patriotism” from Roosevelt was necessary. 103 With the help of George Creel who wrote the letter
“Yes or No, Mr. Hughes?” Woolley rounded up thirty-six of “the country’s foremost publicists
and literary men” and they signed the open letter to Mr. Hughes. 104 The letter contained ten
questions dealing with the main issues of the 1916 election, in particular Hughes’s stance on
foreign policy. The criticism for Hughes that followed came from all sides, especially from
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Roosevelt. Having Hughes and Roosevelt antagonize each other undermined the credibility of
the Republican Party as well as steered negative attacks away from Wilson.
A telegraph written to Woolley by friend Joseph J. Scott, a prominent attorney, read,
“Publication of letter signed by writers and asking questions of Hughes having wonderful effect,
whole country out here commenting on his failure to answer.” 105 Scott went on to call the letter
Woolley created “the finest piece of publicity I have ever seen,” and claimed that, due to the
response to the letter, “Hughes campaign here a frost.”106 Woolley responded assuring Scott that
the letter was being published everywhere that Hughes spoke. Woolley also had an
announcement published in local newspapers on the day before Hughes arrived to the respective
city, urging citizens to “Make Mr. Hughes Answer!” 107 This move on Woolley’s part guaranteed
that people who had already seen the original “Yes or No, Mr. Hughes?” publication would be
reminded of it in a second publication the day before Hughes arrived to their town.
***
Woolley went way over the Bureau of Publicity’s budget. He would send eight pages of
plate matter to 4,000 newspapers every ten days. This cost $1.25 per page per paper. Woolley
considered this “money well expended” as the plates were “most liberally used” by the
newspapers.108 Woolley knew that pushing publications regularly in national newspapers was
worth the great sum.
Going into the 1916 campaign, Woolley had hoped to allot the money that had previously
been spent on printed matter to new advertising efforts. This was a forward-thinking mindset, but
the demand was too high and in the end “a greater amount of printed matter than was ever used
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by the Democrats in any previous campaign [...] was distributed.” 109 The Republicans had
“practically unlimited funds” and Woolley was determined to keep up and not let the Republican
publicity efforts overshadow the efficient work being done by the Democrats. 110 In the final
weeks of the campaign, Woolley could see that the mass amount of Republican advertising was
proving to be effective, so he spent $200,000 on advertising placements coast to coast. 111
Woolley created advertising content for the streetcar, billboard and electric signs, continuing to
take full advantage of new mediums available to him.
All of the pamphlets and publications that the Democratic Party publicity bureau released
were patriotic, appealing to one of the important issues of the day, and some created a sense of
guilt for any readers of the opposition. “Stand by the president” was a pamphlet published that
made it seem unpatriotic to not support the incumbent in the upcoming election. 112 On July 3,
1916, the front page headline for the Democratic National Committee-produced Bulletin read,
“Wilson has kept party pledges in letter and spirit,” with front page articles titled: “Facts refute
republican prophecies of calamity: Prosperity under democracy overthrows Leader Mann’s dire
forecasts,” “Platform of democracy is written into statute law: Detailed analysis shows unrivalled
record of promises redeemed in four years of president’s administration- farmer and laborer get
action instead of empty G.O.P phrases,” and “Real reforms in people’s interest.” 113 Woolley’s
work as a journalist aided in his ability to create attention-grabbing headlines that could appeal to
any American.
***
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The Democratic Party’s campaign propaganda elevated Wilson to a new status of peace
and prosperity, a champion of the American citizen and human rights. Wilson’s campaign slogan
was “Place Human Rights Above Property Rights.” One of the more creative pieces Woolley’s
publicity bureau sent out was a mailing card to the nonpartisan league saying, “Citizenship above
partisanship” continuing to portray Wilson as simply a champion of the people, and alluding that
any good American citizen would vote for Wilson, putting their role as an American above their
partisan obligations. 114 Woolley’s staff released pamphlets on every issue that was relevant to the
1916 presidential election including but not limiting to the tariff, child labor, Mexico, agriculture
and the war ensuring that there was no topic left unpublicized. 115
While Woolley and his publicity bureau were crafty in their ability to frame Wilson as
the president who had accomplished so much, they also took part in the more negative side of
candidate-centric campaigning. A newspaper clipping created by the Democratic National
Committee Bureau of Publicity and sent to editors had in big bolded letters, “War Obstruction
By Republicans Proved: Record of Votes in Congress Shows Opposition to Essential War
Measures.”116 Without even reading the article Woolley was able to make readers doubt the
Republican Party in the war effort. One editorial published in the Charles Johnson Post read,
“Republicans have made a political science of hatred and of the lofty achievements of President
Wilson a creed of contempt.”117 Key phrases that follow in the editorial included “groped for lie
and slander,” and “lied in an evil blindness.” One propaganda piece titled, “Women’s Billionaire
Train,” portrayed Hughes’s female supporters as being privileged billionaires while Wilson’s
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female supporters placed humanity and human rights above all else. 118 Another anti-Hughes
propaganda piece titled, “Why Justice Hughes should not be a candidate,” listed the author of the
publication as Justice Charles E. Hughes, portraying Hughes as amateur and incapable. 119
***
Robert Woolley’s expertise went beyond simply publishing periodicals and
advertisements. In 1916, women in a number of western states were able to vote. Woolley wrote
that these women were using their ability to vote “intelligently and to good effect.” 120 He knew
they were proud of their successful suffrage movement. On the other side of the country were
“voteless Eastern women with wealthy husbands.” 121 These women, as Woolley recalled,
“thought it would be a grand idea to go forth into the country, to instruct the remote and
benighted of the great open spaces and ocean-bordered territory beyond as to why our fair land
was doomed to come a cropper if Wilson should be reelected.” 122 Simply, an anti-Wilson march
of wealthy women who were unable to vote was about to take place across the country. Woolley
sarcastically commented in his unpublished autobiography that Republican National Committee
Chairman William Russell Wilcox “and his master strategists, also his experts on female
psychology” agreed and sixty-six women signed up for the march. 123
Woolley had no intention of interfering with the march that was to start in New York. He
planned for only one story to be released for publication in the morning newspapers on the day
that the women were to start their march in New York. With the help of Harding who wrote the
story, they created a “wholly factual” story on the women of the march. 124 One had a famous
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diamond dog collar that cost more than $10,000. Another woman made a statement to a reporter
saying it was shame that the husbands could not attend as there was too much activity on Wall
Street. After Woolley released this story, he believed nature would take its course. “Reminiscent
Republican veterans,” he wrote, “will tell you that Nature did.” 125
And so, the protests and heckling began. Crowds taunted them. Working girls followed
the march holding banners that read, “Go Back to Wall Street; We Want Wilson!” 126 With each
new city the marching women visited, newspapers “revamped, often with embellishments” the
original story that the Democratic National Committee had published. This was “just as our
publicity group predicted they would do,” Woolley said. 127 The march began to dwindle.
Woolley was able to successfully frame these Hughes-supporting women as privileged elitists,
out of touch with the everyday American reality. “And so it went,” Woolley wrote, “The writer
divulges no secret when he states that from the hour the so-called Golden Special left Buffaloespecially following the humiliating fiasco at Chicago- the Republican managers in New York
devoutly wished they had never heard of it.” 128
Woolley’s publicity bureau only published the one story. The story was immensely
effective, thanks to Woolley’s predictive expertise, and led to the response Woolley hoped it
would. Woolley knew when to publish the story, and, with the help of Harding, he knew exactly
how to frame the women to tarnish the march before it had even begun. He knew that as the
women made their way west papers across the country would pick up the story and
sensationalize it. “A king’s ransom would they [Republicans] have cheerfully given to have been
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rid of it-unnoticed,” Woolley wrote, “But they had a bear by the tail!” 129 Throughout the
election, Woolley remained one step ahead of the Republican publicity efforts.
***
“He kept us out of war” is one of the most famous slogans in campaign history. This
slogan, the brainchild of Robert Woolley, is slightly misleading and yet had serious impact for
Wilson’s campaign. Martin H. Glynn, governor of New York, gave a keynote address and used
the phrase “he kept us out of war” in his speech when he re-nominated Wilson at the Democratic
National Convention in 1916. The speech read, “In particular we commend to the American
people the splendid diplomatic victories of our great president, who has preserved the vital
interests of our government and its citizens and kept us out of war.” Woolley claimed that people
were supposed to infer the word “has” before the phrase “kept us out of war.” 130 If Glynn had
repeated “has,” “endless misunderstandings and needless worry for the director of publicity
would have been avoided,” Woolley said.131 At the time of the campaign, Woolley denied all ties
between him and the slogan.
In the forward of his unpublished autobiography, he called the slogan “controversial,” but
“winning.”132 He went on to say how this controversial and winning slogan originated, “with
which it was my good fortune” had much to do with the Director of Publicity, Woolley, and a
member of the executive committee for the Democratic National Committee. 133 Later on in his
autobiography, Woolley referred to the slogan as “a half-truth and frowned upon officially,” but
claimed it was doing “a wonderful job.”134 Woolley was wise and did distance himself away
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from this “half-truth” slogan. He would caution campaign orators to include “has” when they
used the slogan in their speeches promoting Wilson, knowing very well they would not as “they
were gaining votes; not taking advice.” 135 But at least he made the attempt to correct them, and
thus “tried” to stop the half-truth.
The phrase stuck. Wilson’s campaign team painted him as the candidate who would
maintain peace in America, which left Hughes as the candidate who would lead America to war.
Woolley and his publicity team rode the peace theme created from this slogan all the way
through until the election, drilling the fact that Wilson had, thus far, kept America out of war.
Wilson declared war in April 1917, just six months after winning the election.
***
The night of November 7, 1916 Wilson’s campaign team was pacing as news trickled in
of which states went blue and which went red. No one knew how the election was going to turn
out. Woolley remembered that on election night in 1876, the Democratic chairman “committed
the fatal blunder” of asking the managing editor of The New York Times for the latest news from
three southern states. 136 “I recalled,” Woolley said, “that his inquiry betrayed the fact that the
Democrats had not heard that the return from these states favored their candidates.” 137 Woolley
feared that by exhibiting this lack of confidence Wilson would lose votes in the West. He urged
Chairman McCormick on “the necessity of aggressively claiming--and continuing to claim--that
we had won.”138 When McCormick and Woolley pulled up outside of the Democratic
headquarters building as results were streaming in, McCormick insisted that Woolley do the
talking to the reporters swarming outside. So for Woolley’s last strategic move in the 1916
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election, he bluffed his way to victory. Reporters hounded him as he walked to the door and he
simply turned to them said, “We have won.”139
One reporter asked Woolley how many electoral votes Wilson had won. “Three hundred
and six,” Woolley responded. “Name the states,” demanded the reporter. “I haven’t time. I’ll do
that later,” Woolley said, “Just say we claim three hundred and six electoral votes.”140 The press
went on to project 306 current electoral votes for Wilson. Wilson went on the win 277 electoral
votes, and a very narrow victory over Charles E. Hughes who won 254. Later that night, as
celebration erupted, Woolley saw McCormick, hoisted up by the legs, point to him and say,
“Grab Bob Woolley! He is the man who won this election!”
***
Following the election, Robert Woolley received mass amounts of telegrams from
Democratic leaders across the country thanking him for the critical work that he did. His
accomplishments did not go unnoticed. The Atlanta Journal referred to Woolley as “the
sensation of the campaign.”141 One acquaintance, Dick Jones, wrote to Woolley, “I have watched
National Campaign press stuff for twenty years and never saw anything to compare with the
service you put out.”142 Everyone who sent Woolley telegrams congratulating and thanking him
acknowledged that Wilson’s success likely would not have happened without him. No one could
deny that Woolley played a critical role in the campaign or that his work was a “big factor” in
the “ultimate successful outcome.” 143 Even Woolley knew of the successful work he had done. In
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his letter to Vance McCormick recapping his work on the campaign, he concludes his letter
saying “the publicity played rather an important part in a successful Party.” 144
He masterfully ran his press bureau like a metropolitan daily and properly delegated work
to experts whom he trusted and respected such as Creel and Harding. In the guidelines for the
Bureau of Publicity, Woolley established that “the quantity of matter sent out should depend
entirely upon the quality of the material from which it is prepared.” 145 Woolley’s concern was
not getting the most publicity out, but instead, the best and most persuasive publicity. Further, he
strategically used all available mediums methodically in a way that had not been seen before to
conduct a new style of candidate-centric campaigning with widespread and constant publicity.
The idea of publicity for presidential candidates was not new in this election. The expertise by
someone to manipulate the information and control the message in such a way as to persuade the
American people on a national scale that your candidate is the right candidate as Robert Woolley
did, however, had never been seen before.
Robert Woolley could predict what would be a mishap for Hughes and a success for
Wilson. Woolley’s methodical quality-over-quantity approach and his ability to always be one
step ahead brought Wilson the victory in 1916 and brought on a new era of behind-the-scenes
publicity experts running the show. The 1916 election had a solidified, definitive and necessary
aspect of modern publicity, and with Robert Woolley came the era of publicity experts who
created the foundations for later publicity leaders to come.
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CHAPTER 3: “Wiggle and Wobble”
It was a great privilege to have spent the day with the Senator, and
to have known him. When the country knows him, his election will
be certain. He surely rounded out our poster in just the way that
was needed.
- Albert Lasker to George Christian, 1920146

On September 21, 1920, Republican National Committee Chairman Will Hays wrote to
Republican presidential nominee, Ohio Senator Warren G. Harding, “Thanks for your letter with
the reproduction of the Democratic advertising in 1916. We are going to do some business with
this.”147 Robert Woolley had conducted arguably the best publicity campaign in history for
Wilson in 1916, raising the bar for future campaigns. In 1920, the United States was facing the
aftermath of World War I. Public satisfaction for Woodrow Wilson was at an all-time low, so the
1920 election was the Republicans’ to lose. The Democrats nominated Ohio Governor James M.
Cox and the Republicans confidently nominated Senator Warren G. Harding. Both men were
self-established newspaper publishers from Ohio. While the Republican Party felt confident
going into the election, a well-executed campaign strategy was necessary as Democratic
candidate Cox was a vibrant crowd-pleaser whereas Harding was rather mediocre.
The Republican Party sensed Americans wanted a “return to a conservative philosophy
of government.”148 Trying to go back to a more conservative presidency, Will Hays, Republican
National Committee chairman and Harding’s campaign manager, designed a front-porch
campaign patterned after McKinley’s successful approach in 1896. Harding’s team decided that
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the less Harding said the better in order to reconnect with Americans via the slow-paced
campaigning style of the past. 149 Knowing that publicity was going to be a crucial factor in the
1920 presidential campaign, Hays hired advertising expert Albert Lasker of Lord & Thomas
advertising firm in Chicago. Since the Republican Party did not want Harding to say too much
about the issues during his campaign, Lasker was left with the important task with what scholars
considered to “motivate, but not necessarily inform,” in the developing candidate-centric era of
American campaigning.150 The election was a landslide, and Harding beat Cox with the second
largest popular vote percentage in history after James Monroe in 1820. 151
***
Albert Davis Lasker, born in May 1880 to a German-Jewish family from Galveston,
Texas, was exposed to the workings of business and advertising at a very young age. His father
Morris, a man of “liberal views,” ran a milling business and was the president of “no fewer than
three banks” including a national bank, a state savings bank and a trust company. 152 The Lasker
family lived in a four-story Victorian home with two bathrooms, an “unprecedented number for
the Galveston of the day.”153 The Lasker children had an unusual upbringing as they were
“neglected one day” and “spoiled the next.”154 In his biography of Albert Lasker, John Gunther
considered Morris Lasker to have been a “dictator” and “tyrant” within their household. 155
Throughout Albert Lasker’s childhood he never felt loved enough and always felt that he had to
prove himself worthy to his father. This would later come to influence Lasker’s constant desire
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for success in life and potentially contributed to his mental instability that he developed as a
young adult.
Albert Lasker was a generous man throughout his life and a philanthropist.156 He
“remade” the American Cancer Society and “did much to awaken the federal government”
regarding the need for medical research. 157 Lasker’s mind worked faster than his tongue would
talk. He often had to pause during a conversation before getting ahead of himself and tonguetied. Those close to him described Lasker as having a radiant sense of humor as well as a
bubbling temper.
At the age of twelve, Lasker singlehandedly wrote, edited and published a four-page
weekly newspaper titled The Galveston Press. Gunther called it “remarkable.”158 It was with this
newspaper that Lasker had his first encounter with advertising, as he would solicit the
advertisements for the paper himself. When Lasker was in high school he became the editor of
the school magazine, but gave up the position after a year because he thought it “undemocratic”
to be editor for more than one term. 159 Around the age of thirteen he was hired at the Galveston
Morning News where he covered sports, crime, theater, business and politics. “At that time,”
Lasker believed he was “definitely headed toward a newspaper career.” 160 When he graduated
from high school in 1896, he became a regular member of the Morning News staff just in time
for the 1896 election year. The Morning News assigned Lasker to cover the campaign of
Galveston’s R. B. Hawley, a Republican running for Congress. While his family members were
“ardent Democrats,” he studied Republican campaign pamphlets, “inspected Republican
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horizons on a national level” and accompanied Hawley throughout the district.161 Taken with
Lasker, Hawley hired him as his secretary and ghostwriter, and Lasker “gave all his energies into
the campaign.”162 After Hawley’s victory, he offered Lasker a job in Washington but Lasker
refused as he believed he was too young. Regardless, this was a major turning point for Lasker
because at this point he became an “avowed Republican.” 163
Lasker’s father did not want him to become a newspaper man. In 1898, Morris wrote to
Lord & Thomas of Chicago, a firm with whom he had worked with in the past, to try to get
Lasker a job in advertising, a “kindred field,” as his father considered it. 164 Lord & Thomas
agreed to let Lasker come work for a trial period of three months and then would decide whether
or not to keep him on. Lasker was certain he would not last the three-month test period. He had
full intentions to simply enjoy being in a big city for the first time on a “semi-vacation” before
heading to New York to start his career in journalism. 165
While Lasker was in Chicago he lost in a crap game and owed a gambler several hundred
dollars that he did not have. He went to Mr. Thomas of Lord & Thomas not knowing what else
to do. Lasker convinced Thomas to settle his $500 debt and in return, Lasker would stay with
Lord & Thomas to pay off the $500. “I had never before sold anything to anybody,” Lasker
recalled, “but I did a salesmanship job that day.” 166 Lasker never went back to reporting and
began to take his job at Lord & Thomas seriously, teaching himself everything he could about
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advertising. Lasker claimed that in that office “modern advertising was subsequently born” as a
result of a crap game. 167
Lasker worked his way up the ladder quickly at Lord & Thomas. When Lord retired in
1904, just five years after Lasker’s arrival, Lasker became a partner of the firm and in 1912
became the sole owner. Some of Lasker’s notable clients included Lucky Strike, Quaker,
Sunkist, Goodyear and Van Camp. Lasker gave advertising “motive force” and “motive
power.”168 In the spring of 1904 a stranger by the name of John E. Kennedy came to visit Lasker
at work telling him that he knew what advertising was. Lasker met with him, and Kennedy
explained to him that advertising was salesmanship in print and all revolved around one concept:
you have to give the consumer a “reason why” they should purchase your product. 169 Gunther
pointed out that while this may seem obvious in modern times, advertising had never been
described so simply and definitively. Lasker hired Kennedy and in very little time “every agency
in the world adopted the ‘Salesmanship in Print’ and ‘Reason Why’ formulae” practiced by
Lasker.170 By 1917, Lord & Thomas was the most “celebrated and prosperous” ad agency in the
world with Lasker at the forefront of their success. 171
In June 1918, Albert Lasker met Will H. Hays. Hays had just been elected as chairman of
the Republican National Committee and sought out Lasker to help in the 1918 midterm elections.
Lasker worked closely with Hays and helped lead the Republican Party to victory in 1918. He
then went back to Chicago until he was approached again a little over a year later to come on
board for the 1920 presidential campaign.
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***
With the exception of one piece, majority of the literature on Albert Lasker extensively
discusses his work at Lord & Thomas. His work on Harding’s 1920 campaign receives a chapter
at most. Focus is given to how naturally-occurring Harding’s campaign seemed to the American
public because of Lasker’s behind-the-scenes work. While this is an important quality in any
publicity director, Lasker was particularly skillful at crafting everything to look unplanned. What
really makes Lasker stand out, however, was how he not only merged the fields of advertising
and politics in the new candidate-centric era, but planned it so thoroughly as he would an
advertising campaign: perfectly synchronized with strong coordination, catchy phrasing and
punctual dissemination in a time where many advertising mediums were still new. Albert Lasker
was first and foremost an advertising genius, and Harding was the next big commodity. Robert
Woolley had utilized new mediums and methods of dissemination to construct a well-managed
campaign in 1916 and now, in 1920, Lasker would build upon this foundation with new
persuasion methods of his own.
Robert J. Brake in his research on the 1920 election wrote, “The Republican campaign
was so thoroughly planned and executed that it stands as a model of smoothness and
efficiency.”172 Brake mentioned Albert Lasker as the “adman” who “was hired to direct a
massive publicity program” which included “parades, billboards, magazine advertisements,
motion pictures, newspaper statements, phonograph appeals, posters, telephone conferences, Girl
Scout babysitters, and motor corps to carry voters to the polls.” 173 Further, Brake credited Lasker
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with creating the campaign to “humanize” Harding. 174 The idea of humanizing Harding to the
American people was the foundation for Harding’s image throughout the campaign.
By this election, “advertising was well on its way to enveloping America in slogans and
images.”175 Gil Troy claimed that while the Republicans wanted a “mediocre” candidate in 1920
as the “antidote” to current President Wilson, they still acknowledged the need for great
publicity.176 An important aspect of Lasker’s work, noted by Troy, is how Lasker “kept his
fingerprints off his handiwork.” 177 As previously stated, Albert Lasker was particularly good at
making sure that nothing looked like a prepared spectacle, but appeared as natural and on-thespot, as if created by Harding himself in that moment.
David Greenberg in his exceptional history of publicity and spin identified Albert Lasker
as being one of the key players in why advertising became important techniques in the world of
politics. With Lasker, Greenberg wrote, for the first time an “advertising man, not a career
journalist, was in charge of promoting a candidate for the White House.” 178 Further, with the
growth of advertising and new mediums in the 1920’s, the public was more “manipulable” with
publicity messages. 179 Greenberg concluded that shaping voter opinion now required “an adman”
like Lasker, as opposed to “a professor” like Wilson had been. 180 Lasker had at his disposal
countless advertising techniques in the new “visual age.” 181 Similar to Troy, Greenberg noted
that Lasker kept his role on Harding’s campaign silent from the press. Greenberg made a
valuable point in his chapter discussing Albert Lasker; Lasker with his advertising and publicity
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tactics did not win the election for Harding, as perhaps Woolley did with Wilson. Lasker’s
efforts are not memorable because he determined the election outcome, his efforts are
memorable because they were unprecedented as America saw the intertwining of the advertising
industry and political campaigns for the first time.
The goal for Lasker and Harding’s publicity team was to make Harding appear oldfashioned and human to the American public. However, “in order to manipulate what on the
surface seemed to be an innocent, old-fashioned front-porch campaign,” John Morello wrote, “a
very modern campaign management structure” was necessary. 182 Albert Lasker’s strongest
technique, according to Morello, was his ability to blend the old and the new, the “old” being the
front-porch style campaign, the “new” being Lasker’s modern advertising ideas such as “reason
why” advertising and his use of mediums for advertisements. 183 While Lasker was able to run a
seemingly casual, old-fashioned campaign, Morello wrote that he was incorporating the “new”
by establishing good press relations and “spoonfeeding” the media with preplanned stories and
photo-ops. “The dependence on people such as Albert Lasker to influence the outcome of
elections,” said Morello, “seems to have been part of an evolutionary stage in the American
political process.”184 The American political process had evolved from the party bosses making
all of the decisions to merchandising, advertising, and expert showmanship.
In May 1920, just months before the election, Richard Boeckel, reporter for The
Independent, wrote that the number of people who would vote for a candidate based on party
would be “smaller than ever.”185 Instead, “the overwhelming majority,” he predicted, would vote
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based on “what they know about the candidate… about his principles and his personality.” 186
Boeckel went on to make the powerful assertion: “The man with the best story wins.” 187 With
this phrase, Boeckel was able to describe modern politics in 1920’s America. Boeckel stressed
the importance of the publicity agent when he said that by 1920 the publicity agent had become
the “president maker.”188
***
Lasker had a knack for sloganeering and accurately identified what would stick. He
conducted a candidate-focused advertising campaign to sell Harding as the relatable, allAmerican candidate who would bring a return to normalcy in America. This involved a lot of
planning and work on behalf of Harding’s campaign team, because they had to create an entire
appearance around a man who’s biggest weakness was that he “revealed his whole character” up
front, as Lasker put it. 189 So, from the front-porch of Marion, Ohio, Lasker implemented his
“reason why” tactics from Lord & Thomas and set out to give Americans the reasons why they
should elect Warren Harding. This was campaigning in the 1920’s: advertising to move the
crowd and persuade a manipulable consumer-based culture. Albert Lasker had limited political
background and yet, merging advertising into the world of politics, conducted one of the best
publicity campaigns in history.
Lasker’s correspondence shows that he used every advertising medium available to him
during the campaign. Examples include publishing content in magazines and newspapers,
creating animated busts of Senator Harding, printing posters, sending footage to movie theaters
and printing advertisements on billboards. Advertising material such as campaign buttons,
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lithographs and literature were sent all over to state headquarters and supportive newspapers.190
Further, he worked very closely with the press to make sure that they were receiving the
information that Lasker wanted them to receive, guaranteeing favorable coverage from Marion.
As people flocked to Marion to see and meet Harding, Lasker was in charge of arranging
all of the spectacles, hiring the welcome band, assigning photographers to capture snapshots at
the right moments as well as organizing speakers on Harding’s behalf. On October 19, 1920, the
New York Times reported that Harding saw more than 25,000 visitors come to Marion, Ohio in
honor of “First Voters Day,” which celebrated citizens who were going to cast their first ballot in
the upcoming election. 191 The local South-Bend News-Times wrote that the event was created so
Harding could speak on the “duties and opportunities” for the new voters in 1920. 192 Naturally,
there were huge processions and parades throughout Marion all day to welcome the visitors as
Lasker orchestrated a grand, nationally-covered event to celebrate the patriotism of new voters.
Lasker even used people as advertising mediums. He made it a priority in the campaign
to have “distinguished visitors” visit Marion.193 In a pioneering move in the world of politics,
Lasker invited celebrities to campaign on Harding’s behalf who traditionally had never publicly
taken partisan stances. He established the Harding-Coolidge Theatrical League, a group of actors
and actresses who campaigned nationally for Harding and made appearances in Marion where
they were greeted by gestures of grandeur and awestruck fans. In modern elections, celebrity
endorsements for a candidate are common as celebrities have credibility and serve as role models
for many Americans. Lasker was one of the first to recognize the potential influence that a
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celebrity endorsement could have, and he used this influence to the campaign’s full advantage
organizing celebrity appearances across the nation to promote Harding.
In August, when the campaign really took off, Lasker was in frequent contact with his
campaign associates to make sure that invitations to potential visitors were sent out in a timely
manner. He was adamant that there be no delay in sending out the invitations as he believed “it is
the crux of our publicity that these parties begin calling as soon as possible.” 194 While it was
primarily Lasker’s job in the beginning to oversee the coordination of visitors, he passed the duty
on to Judson Welliver, one of Harding’s close publicity aids, later in the campaign when he had
more pressing responsibilities. Nonetheless, Lasker still stayed in close contact with Welliver
throughout the campaign to ensure everything was running smoothly with his “distinguished
visitors.”
Lasker not only worked to bring well-known and influential supporters to Marion, but
also planned what they should say on Harding’s behalf. For example, Lasker and Hays worked
on getting Italian singer Enrico Caruso to the front porch in Marion, and Lasker viewed this as a
prime opportunity to stress Harding’s stance on staying out of European affairs. 195 What better
way to sell Harding’s stance on European affairs than by having a European affirm it? Everyone
and everything was a medium that could sell for Lasker, and Harding was the product. He never
missed an opportunity to solidify Harding’s credibility via endorsements and testaments by
people who would have influence.
Harding was a good-looking man and Lasker saw this as a key to his popularity. He
assigned photographers to take frequent close-up shots of Harding highlighting his features.
Lasker also took advantage of Harding’s front-porch campaign style for photo-ops. He instructed
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photographers to snap shots of Harding and his wife at home, engaged in routine activities a
normal, average American could relate to. It was Lasker’s intention to make Harding appear to
be an “old-fashioned, sage, honest-to-the-core Middle Westerner who could be trusted never to
rock the boat.”196 Lasker made sure that camera crews were always available to capture Harding
behaving like the everyday American that was running for president.
***
In July 1920, footage was released that showed Harding playing golf. The public’s
reaction was not what was expected. Lasker wrote to his friend, Walter Friedlander, an owner of
the Cincinnati Reds, that the footage “has drawn a perfectly surprising amount of unfavorable
reaction,” as many considered golf to be an elitist sport. 197 Lasker went on to say that the
campaign received hundreds of letters from people calling it a “rich man’s game.” 198 After
receiving all of the negative backlash, Lasker orchestrated one of his biggest advertising
campaigns yet by attempting to persuade America that Harding was a lover of America’s favorite
past time, baseball. Lasker’s original intention was to bring two major league teams to Marion,
allowing Harding to “come out in the wholehearted way he feels” in connection with baseball,
which Lasker believed would be “favorably received by the country.” 199 When writing to a
friend, Lasker reiterated how much Harding liked baseball and how great it would be for him to
demonstrate his affection for the sport. When writing to other members of the campaign, he
spoke more bluntly about the publicity benefits, claiming that they could “work it up in such a
way as to do a great deal of good.” 200 Lasker was very close friends with William Wrigley Jr.
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and as they were both co-owners of the Chicago Cubs, the two made great, luckily successful,
efforts to bring the Cubs to Marion.
Lasker struggled to find a date that worked for two major league teams to play in Marion,
and worked without great success for a time but was “determined to put it through.” 201 He knew
that it was impossible to sell Harding as a relatable, everyday candidate when people associated
him with an elitist sport. Lasker was finally able to arrange for the Chicago Cubs to come to
Marion and play a local baseball team. For the newspaper announcement that would publicize
the game, Lasker wrote in his suggestion draft to Christian:
Some time ago William Wrigley and A.D. Lasker- two of the most main owners of
the Cubs, and who are active in Senator Harding’s campaign- were in Marion. At
that time the Senator, who is a great baseball fan, second only to Mrs. Harding, spoke
of his love for the game and how, because of his stay at Marion, he missed that
diversion. […] Wrigley and Lasker President of the Cubs, the latter arranged for the
team to stop-off to play at Marion on its next trip East, etc. etc. 202
Lasker told Christian that he should present the announcement as if the team casually stopped by
to play the game because the Harding’s, devoted lovers of baseball, had been without the sport
for too long.
In preparation for the game, Lasker widely advertised the game around Marion to draw in
as many spectators as possible. He also made arrangements for film crews to capture footage of
Harding at the game for distribution to the theaters. In a letter to Welliver, Lasker wrote that a
big turnout of supporters was important “for the publicity value in the papers,” as well as “for
what it would mean to the Movies.” 203 After the game, Lasker ensured that every member of the
Cubs was enrolled in his Harding-Coolidge Theatrical League that he had started for
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celebrities.204 Famous actress Mary McLaren was the one who very publicly enrolled each man.
Photographs were widely distributed of the team signing up next to her. Lasker convinced
America that Harding, man of the people, was a lover of baseball just like them. The Anaconda
Standard of Anaconda, Montana printed a picture of Harding signing the game ball with the
caption:
The Chicago Cubs visited Marion, Ohio, and played a game with the local talent
for Senator Warren G. Harding, republican nominee for presidency. Harding is a
regular baseball fan, and this is the first chance he has had to cheer since he left
Washington. Senator Harding threw out the first ball, and the speedy peg to the
catcher showed that the senator’s soupbone is in good condition. Harding then
autographed the balls used for the members of the Chicago team. 205
Another story in The Fort-Wayne Sentinel of Fort-Wayne, Indiana, printed the headline,
“Chicago Cubs at Marion: Senator Harding is Great Baseball Fan.”206 An excerpt from the story
read, “The engagement was made today as a result of a chance remark by the senator that one of
the biggest handicaps of the front porch was his inability to see baseball games.” Again, Lasker’s
ability to plan, predict and sell proved to be exceptional as newspapers caught Harding’s “chance
remark” that he missed the game of baseball, and only then did planning a spontaneous game
occur. Newspapers nationwide reported that Harding was finally able to enjoy his favorite
activity, which he had been deprived of since leaving Washington. Further, as Harding threw the
first pitch, one can only wonder how much practice went into preparing Harding for his
successful “speedy peg to the catcher.”
***
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On August 28, 1920, Harding gave a speech on the League of Nations that Lasker had
considered to be “the most important speech he will make during the whole campaign.” 207 In
Harding’s speech, Lasker added the phrase “Let’s be done with Wiggle and Wobble.” He hoped
this would become a slogan attacking Cox’s wavering stance on the League of Nations. The
phrase was meant to show how Wilson “wobbled from watchful waiting to peaceful penetration
in Mexico,” and how now Cox was trying to “wiggle” from Wilson’s League position to a
position where he is pro-league “with reservation.”208 The phrase was also meant to attack how
the Democrats in general had wiggled and wobbled with their responsibilities and electing a
Republican ticket would ensure steadfast surety in Washington.
Lasker’s correspondence indicates that he was adamant in preparation for Harding’s
League of Nations speech with special focus on the phrase “Let’s be done with Wiggle and
Wobble.” Lasker would use news editorials to gauge how Republican-leaning press were
covering certain issues favorable to Harding’s campaign, and would then cater the language of
Harding’s speech to fit the mold. The idea of incorporating the “wiggle and wobble” phrase into
Harding’s speech came after Lasker noted that the Chicago Tribune, a Republican-leaning
newspaper, had published a piece about Cox’s wiggling and wobbling all over the place with his
League stance. This is “evidence that some of our [Republican-leaning] press are already treating
Cox’s attitude on the League of Nations as one of ‘wiggle and wobble,’” Lasker wrote to
Harding’s secretary, George Christian, on August 19, nine days before Harding’s speech. 209
Lasker spent the week before Harding’s League speech preparing to send it out to the
press in an exact time frame. Lasker wanted Republican editors to have the speech in advance in
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hopes that they would be able to “thoroughly digest it and get their bearings.” 210 To make sure
editors across the nation all received the speech forty-eight hours in advance, Lasker
methodically arranged for mail releases to be sent to “the far points” on the first day and the
nearer points on the second day to ensure they all received the speech at the same time. 211 He
remained one step ahead with thorough planning and preparation work.
While putting in great efforts to ensure that the that the phrase was used multiple times
throughout the speech and that the press were aware, Lasker also took strides to make sure that
the phrase appeared to have been said naturally and with unplanned ease in the speech. In a letter
to Welliver days before the speech Lasker writes, “We want it to appear when the candidate
wrote this sentence in his speech it was merely a passing sentence that he injected, but that it was
so forceful that it was spontaneously picked up.”212 He encouraged any communication with
local correspondents about the potential future slogan be done in a manner that the reporters
would not know that “the publicity end of the campaign had anything to do with the
expression.”213 As Harding’s image revolved around the idea that he was a natural, everyday
kind of candidate, his slogan had to originate as such.
In mid-August, before Harding even gave the League of Nations speech, Lasker planned
for billboards to go up nationwide on October 1 with the slogan “Let’s be done with Wiggle and
Wobble.”214 This gave the campaign a month to re-emphasize the phrase and for the papers to
begin using it so that by the time October came, it would seem that the phrase was so impactful
during Harding’s speech on August 28 that the campaign then decided to take it on as the new
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campaign slogan. Lasker clearly foresaw the advertising potential in the speech’s success and
built on it, knowing what would sell. Interestingly, The Washington Times printed a story on
August 31, 1920, revealing that the Democratic Party knew about Lasker’s intention to widely
distribute the slogan on billboards in October and tried to expose him and get in front of Lasker’s
plan. “Their secret is out,” the paper quoted Democratic Senator Pat Harrison, “Two weeks ago a
sketch of the Republican poster found its way to Democratic headquarters.” 215 Harrison went on
to state that thousands of the sketches were being shipped to distribution centers and claimed that
the Democratic Party “urges the opposition to give it the widest publicity” as Harrison thought
they could spin the slogan in their favor.
Harrison was wrong, the speech had been a success and, per Lasker’s prediction, the
slogan was widely repeated in publications. A friend wrote to Harding afterwards, “Cordial
congratulations on your League of Nations speech today period the substance is extra-ordinarily
good the style very fine and the presentation most masterly and convincing period your position
will win the country.”216 Following the speech, favorable newspapers quickly began to use the
phrase “Wiggle and Wobble” when discussing Cox’s League stance. Proving that Lasker worked
well with the media in an effort to establish a mutually beneficial relationship with them, he
wrote to Christian asking if Harding could quote the use of the phrase by the Philadelphia
Ledger in either a speech or an address to newspaper men as he predicted it would receive
“added publicity in the press.”217
***
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In August 1920, all American women earned the right to vote making them a critical
target group for both campaigns. Lasker wasted no time and immediately began targeting women
with campaign advertisements. In August, Lasker worked quickly to send one advertisement to
22,000,000 women’s circulation including the Ladies Home Journal and Pictorial Review.218 An
advertisement printed a couple of months later in the Needlecraft Magazine November issue is
titled, “Women! For Your Own Good Vote the Republican Ticket.” 219 The advertisement
included a quote by Harding on ending child labor and improving working conditions for female
employees. The advertisement was anti-war, claiming “For woman is for peace,” and asserted
that the Democratic Party “asked for votes for the Democratic President because ‘he kept us out
of war.’ He got them and five months later the United States entered the world war.” 220 The
advertisement also included the header “Mother’s duty to their sons,” with the paragraph below
promising that with the election of Warren Harding, no mother would have to give their son to
war.221 A Democratic National Committee produced advertisement in the Ladies Home Journal
published around the same time was far less compelling and demonstrates the superiority of
Lasker’s work. The advertisement was titled, “Women of America! You are interested in the
Election of Cox and Roosevelt.” 222 The advertisement went on to emphasize “permanent peace,
progress, prosperity and the recognition of women’s value as citizens of the republic.” 223 The
advertisement had no emotional appeal to the female demographic who, just months prior,
received the right to vote and lacks any relatable aspect. When comparing the two
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advertisements that were published at the same time, there is no question that the Republican
advertisement is the work of an expert.
Like Woolley, Lasker and his team spent more than they had. In August 1920, Will Hays
testified before a senatorial committee investigating the campaign funds. In his statement, Hays
said that out of the $3,079,037.20 budget for Harding’s campaign, $1,346,500 was for publicity
uses.224 The next biggest spending expenditure in the budget was $750,874.20 for headquarters
expense. By October, they had already gone over budget having spent $3,160, 451.76. 225 Clara
Savage, reporter for the New York Times, went to the Republican Headquarters and was taken
aback by the large variety of promotional buttons. The Republicans spent $76,000 on buttons
alone.226 Moreover, “other expenses involved in convincing the voter that the G.O.P is the party
for which to vote, and that they want to see Mr. Harding in the White House” included $37,600
on lithographs, $242,00 on paid advertising, $60,000 on pamphlets and $21,000 on billboard
posters and electric signs.227 The Democrats did not spend nearly as much on their publicity
endeavors. As the Republicans spent significantly more than the Democrats and had more access
to money from supportive businesses and big donors, they were still able to portray Harding and
the Republican Party as the more modest, down to earth option. For example, during the
campaign, the Republican National Committee released a picture titled “Homes of the
Candidates,” which included pictures of Harding and his running mate Coolidge’s “modest”
homes next to the more “pretentious” homes of Cox and his running mate, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, continuing to portray Harding as the all-American, relatable candidate. 228
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***
I do not make the claim that Albert Lasker won the election for Warren Harding in 1920.
What he did do, however, was bring modern advertising into the world of politics and implement
publicity into the campaign in a way that had not been done before. He was the first adman to
run publicity for a campaign, and he impacted future campaigns with the techniques he used and
how he advanced the concept of a “candidate-centered” campaign strategy. Albert Lasker created
the image that was Warren Harding, highlighting Harding’s qualities in a way that sold him to
the people. His ability to predict what would sell was unparalleled. Lasker was an integral part in
the continued development of publicity in presidential campaigns. In his biography on Albert
Lasker, Gunther claimed, “The seeds were thus sown, far back in 1920, for such piquant
phenomena as the ‘Spots for Ike’ in Eisenhower’s campaign thirty-two years later.”229 “Spots for
Ike” was a campaign strategy for Eisenhower’s campaign in 1952 where Eisenhower would
answer the questions of ordinary citizens and be photographed doing so. Later efforts to sell the
candidate to the public using modern advertising techniques are simply building blocks built on
the foundations laid out by advertising pioneer Albert Lasker in 1920.
***
The 1924 and 1928 elections saw a growth in the adoption of the radio in America. The
candidate-centric style of campaigning continued as the Republic Party experienced somewhat of
a golden age in the 1920’s. They were the majority party throughout the decade, and the
Democratic Party had faltered since losing power in the 1920 election. Publicity remained
important, but it was not until the 1932 election that the next transitional figure on the road to
modern campaigning would make great strides on a campaign.
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CHAPTER 4: Herbert Hoover’s Gadfly230
If, for example, a senator delivered a dull and lifeless
anti-Hoover speech, it was probably his own.
If the Hoover Administration was picking splinters
out of its skin for a week afterward, it was a Michelson speech
- Alva Johnston, 1936

In his memoirs reflecting on the 1932 presidential election, Herbert Hoover wrote that the
overall strategy of the opposing party was to “attach to me, personally, the responsibility of the
worldwide depression and its evils.” He claimed that the Democratic Party’s strategy to criticize
and blame was “in some aspects new in American political life.” 231 Hoover had been considered
a “genius at publicity” after a successful 1928 presidential campaign and yet was no match for
the kind of attacks that Charles Michelson, Democratic director of publicity, was targeting him
with in 1932.232
The 1932 election came just three years after Black Tuesday and the Wall Street crash of
1929. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Democratic governor of New York, challenged Republican
incumbent Herbert Hoover. Similar to the negative sentiments people had for Wilson in the 1920
election following World War I, support for current president Hoover was deteriorating as the
Great Depression continued on. The 1932 election is memorable because it was the first smear
campaign of this magnitude, and because FDR “successfully” used new forms of communication
to “craft a ‘candidate-centered’ campaign,” emphasizing “personality as well as (or perhaps more
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than) substance.”233 The 1932 election allowed voters the choice of “a traditional administrative
president,” Hoover, or a “modern rhetorical one,” Roosevelt.234
Roosevelt was exciting to the American people and a perfect candidate for the evolving
candidate-centric campaign style. He mastered the art of the radio and put on a very personable
campaign. Troy wrote that for all of the “apparent spontaneity,” Roosevelt’s campaign was
“carefully planned.”235 Roosevelt had an entire publicity team methodically strategizing his
every move, and at the center of this publicity was Charles Michelson.
***
Charles Michelson was born in 1869 into a “bookish family” in Virginia City, a small yet
“booming” mining town in Nevada.236 His father was a “prosperous shopkeeper;” his sister,
Miriam, was a best-selling novelist; and his brother, Albert, was the first American to win the
Nobel Prize in Physics. 237 As a child Michelson joined the staff of the Virginia City Chronicle
where he served as bookkeeper and assistant reporter. When he was thirteen, the “peaceful
phase” of his career ended when he went to join his brother in Arizona. 238 Michelson had minor
clerk jobs in Arizona until he became “a frontier tramp,” which he considered to be the most
perfect period of his life. 239 This did not last long before he was summoned back to Virginia City
to attend high school. His graduation ceremony was the first time he was exposed to the art of
ghostwriting, as his sister Miriam wrote his graduation address for him.
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After graduating, Michelson ventured to San Francisco to work for the San Francisco
Evening Post under his brother-in-law, the editor. Around this time William Randolph Hearst
had taken over the San Francisco Examiner and began a “whirlwind campaign” to pull the paper
out of the “stodginess of a party organ.” 240 Michelson recalls that working for the Examiner was
the “Promised Land,” and he “promptly became a sooner in the journalistic Oklahoma rush to
join the new outfit,” metaphorically speaking about his attempt to join the Examiner staff.241 He
was hired as an extra man writing about the police courts until being promoted to regular staff.
Michelson worked his way up the ladder at the Examiner and learned much of what he knew
from Hearst, a true expert in the field. After a few years, Hearst summoned Michelson to New
York to write editorials. Not long after, he was sent to Chicago to become the managing editor of
the Examiner Chicago branch. Michelson recalled that frequently throughout his tenure with the
paper he would be required to trade jobs and have a different title. Becoming unhappy with what
he was writing under Hearst’s anti-Wilson agenda, Michelson began working as the Washington
correspondent for the Chicago Herald. Shortly after, he was recruited as the head of the
Washington bureau for the New York World, a position which he “gladly accepted.” 242
As the World’s main Washington correspondent, Michelson was the main political writer
and became familiar with presidential candidates and their campaigns. He remained there until
John J. Raskob, Democratic National Committee chairman, and Jouett Shouse, Democratic
National Committee chair of the executive committee, sought him out in their “campaign for
rehabilitating” the Democratic Party, the minority party for roughly the last decade. 243 It was in
this campaign for rehabilitation that the Democratic National Committee became a full-time,
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year-round, fully functioning organization instead of just an arm of a candidate’s campaign to
become president. Part of their “epic reconstruction” of the Democratic Party was to establish the
first permanent publicity bureau. 244
The Republican Party had conducted consistent and thorough publicity operations
throughout the 1920’s while the Democratic Party’s publicity efforts had “dried up.” 245 It was a
challenge to get the operation up and running again, much less make it as efficient and
widespread as it was by the end of the decade. The permanent Democratic National Committee’s
publicity bureau was established in 1929, with Michelson as the first permanent director of
publicity. Michelson’s publicity work for the 1932 election began shortly after, and for three
years leading up to election day he constantly released material attacking the Hoover
Administration and Republican Party.
***
Michelson’s publicity operation was impressive in its ability to frame Hoover as the
scapegoat for the Depression and Roosevelt the newcomer who could save America. Michelson
took the idea of a candidate-centric campaign a step further by not only centering the campaign
around Roosevelt, but also around Hoover and all of his faults and mistakes. Michelson
emphasized the character and leadership qualities of the candidates more so than campaigns had
done in the past. For all of his accomplishments and years spent as the Democratic Party’s
director of publicity, there is little literature about Charles Michelson.
Being the newspaperman that Michelson was, Greenberg described Michelson as having
a “knack for the catchy phrase and a flair for the dramatic.”246 Greenberg affirmed that during
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the early-to-mid 1900’s publicity directors continued to build off each other’s works and
accomplishments, a critical assumption of this thesis, when he wrote, “Absorbing the lessons of
men like Lasker, Michelson harnessed his gift for sloganeering to an ability to coordinate his
messages.”247 Greenberg also mentioned an important aspect of Michelson’s legacy, his coining
of the terms “Hooverville,” “Hoover Flag,” and other Depression-related phrases linked to
Hoover.
Rosanne Sizer in her research on the smearing of Hoover in the 1932 election
acknowledged Michelson as the key conspirator behind the attacks. Utilizing the Depression to
their full advantage, Michelson’s publicity bureau “undertook a massive campaign to discredit
Hoover.”248 Hoover and the Republican Party attempted to fire back claiming that Michelson’s
bureau was attempting to make “political capital out of public misery.”249 Hoover was not wrong
in this accusation, but public opinion had already been molded and the public’s perception of
Hoover unchanging. Hoover felt personally attacked by Michelson, and as his later memoirs
suggest, would remain bitter for the rest of his life.
In their contemporary analysis of the 1932 election, Roy Peel and Thomas Donnelly
claimed that Michelson’s experience as a journalist served him well in his heading of the smearcampaign against Hoover. “He trained his guns on the Hoover administration,” they wrote “and
never ceased firing until the Republicans evacuated Washington.” 250 Peel and Donnelly
described the success of the smear-campaign being in large part due to Hoover’s initial
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vulnerability, but that Michelson used this vulnerability to his best ability. “No president,” they
wrote, “ever had his every mistake so thoroughly advertised as Mr. Hoover.”251
***
Like Lasker’s role in the 1920 presidential campaign, Michelson and his publicity work
were not determinants for the election outcome in 1932. With the Depression, Hoover’s defeat
was expected. Michelson’s work was nonetheless a milestone in the evolution of campaigns
using publicity, and a focus on his work is necessary in better understanding the modern
mudslinging campaign style that exists in America. While Michelson may not have won the
election for Roosevelt, his policy of “sustained propaganda” turned “defeat into a rout.”252 What
existed in 1932 was the need for “experts” in knowing how to “play upon the emotions,
prejudices, and economic interests of the voter.” 253 Michelson turned Hoover into a villain and at
a time when the American people were devastated and vulnerable, and he successfully made
them believe that their problems were the result of the Hoover Administration.
By 1932, definite party lines had continued to blur with more people becoming
independents and able to be swayed during elections. As majority of campaign funds were spent
on “organization and ‘persuasion,’” the growing number of undecided voters brought on a
necessary “change in the strategy.” 254 New York Times reporter Arthur Krock wrote in 1932 that
campaign management and strategy at the time did not “call for a fine sense of ethics.” While it
would be an applaudable strategy for a campaign manager to “deviate from the ancient system of
deception,” it would in turn do nothing beneficial for the candidate. 255 At one point, Republican
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Representative William Wood of Indiana brought up the debate of “malicious maligning” on the
House floor with regard to Michelson. 256 Never before was press-agentry used in such a modern,
grand manner.
Michelson oversaw all aspects of the Democratic National Committee’s publicity during
the 1932 campaign including all speech material and comments to the press, pamphlets, radio
policy and overall organization of the publicity bureau. As Michelson is known as one of the
greatest political ghostwriters in history, one of his tasks as director of publicity was writing
speeches for Democratic leaders to give on Roosevelt’s behalf, as well as speeches for Roosevelt
himself. Michelson’s bureau consistently sent out releases in the months leading up to the
election with a total of 504 statements issued out during a twenty-two-month period.257 In his
1933 assessment of the bureau’s work between 1930-1932, Thomas Barclay, political scientist
and scholar of the time, noted that “customary methods of distribution” were continued within
Michelson’s bureau as press associations, news agencies, and newspapers nationwide received
the releases, as well as national and state party committee men and women. 258 Michelson ensured
that weekly clip sheets, newsletters and editorials were consistently made available to the press.
Most of Roosevelt’s addresses were broadcast nationally as Michelson expanded the role of the
radio in the process of his publicity work.
When Michelson first accepted the job as director of publicity, he felt that it was
necessary to establish a research bureau within the publicity department. However, after seeking
out a qualified newspaper correspondent to fill the post, no one seemed capable enough for the
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position. Michelson managed to lead the publicity bureau without a designated research division
and instead, he himself conducted the necessary research. Michelson’s bureau sent out mass
amounts of publicity nationwide, but before he would send content to a new source he conducted
thorough research to ensure that the publication was credible. As one telegram correspondence
with Raskob shows, Michelson had prepared an article for the Temperance League for Liquor
Control to publish in the Bi-Monthly News of Dallas. Before sending any material to the paper,
Michelson insisted that the newspaper wire over a report regarding their “quality of publication”
for assessment. Michelson held off on sending a draft of the article to Raskob until he analyzed
the publication’s report.259 Michelson held the this bureau’s work to the highest standard, and
while he was trying to reach every corner of the country, Michelson only published content in
sources that he personally deemed adequate after careful evaluation.
Michelson’s primary issue focuses during the 1932 campaign were the Great Depression
and the Smoot-Hawley tariff. Other recurring topics in the campaign included unemployment
levels and Prohibition. The tariff added stress to an already crumbled economy, and Michelson
worked the tariff to be an important offshoot of the overall economic devastation that Hoover
had carried America into. Out of all the statements Michelson’s bureau released between 19301932, the tariff was the most frequently addressed national issue with one-fifth of the releases
dedicated to discussing it. 260 Manufacturing industries and businesses especially felt
repercussions from the tariff, and Michelson made it his job to “capitalize the grievance” of
every economic group in America. 261
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In his autobiography, The Ghost Talks, Michelson described Hoover as indecisive and
thin-skinned.262 In turn, this is how Michelson portrayed Hoover to the American people.
Michelson wrote that there was no need for “misrepresentation” or “slander,” because what the
Democratic publicity bureau was sending out was the truth. 263 Michelson genuinely believed that
Hoover did not belong in the White House, which likely contributed to the quality of material
that he sent out because he stood behind everything that he published. Hoover’s publicity team
did not help his case. As Michelson presented Hoover’s faults and mistakes to the American
people, Hoover and the Republicans would throw accusations back at the Democratic Party. This
was a mistake by the Republican Party as it further publicized Hoover’s distress from
Michelson’s work, constantly reminding people of what Michelson had written in the first place.
So, in the 1930 midterm election, Democratic Senator Pat Harrison said that the “whispering
campaign of 1928” had been succeeded by the “whimpering campaign of 1930.” 264 Cartoons
surfaced of an elephant crying and distressed, often placing Hoover as the central figure.
Michelson circulated these cartoons throughout the country, making the Republican publicity
bureau regret ever firing back.
Although 1930 was a midterm election, Michelson never once veered his focus away
from the Hoover Administration. The publicity directors for both the Democratic Party and the
Republican Party met with radio companies in 1930, and Michelson suggested an opening topic
of discussion be “The Hoover Administration: Has It Been a Success So Far or a Failure?”265
The publicity director for the Republican National Committee immediately objected arguing that
the midterm election did not concern the president, and that the president’s time in office should
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not play a factor in the election of Congressional members. The radio producers decided not to
go with Michelson’s idea, but from the Republican publicity director’s quick objection,
Michelson knew that his strategy was working and Hoover was suffering.
When Michelson joined the Democratic National Committee in 1929, he wrote that most
people believed that Hoover was “still the magician of the campaign picture.” 266 Every misstep
Hoover took as president and every misfortune “was taken full advantage of and given the widest
possible circulation.”267 Efforts by the Republican publicity bureau to counter Michelson’s
releases and paint Hoover as a martyr to the American people fell on deaf ears. “Blamed by
many of President Hoover’s ardent defenders,” wrote Carter Field for The Decatur Daily News
following the 1932 election, Michelson was “more responsible than all the other factors
combined for convincing the public that Hoover just wouldn’t do.” 268
***
Like Woolley and Lasker, Michelson had an outstanding sense for what would stick and
how publicity material would be perceived by the public. At the beginning, Michelson had
trouble getting anyone to pay attention to the publicity material that he was sending out because
the country was not interested in politics so soon after the 1928 election. That is, Michelson
wrote, until “fate,” which always came to the “aid of the Democrats” in recent time, “took care
of us.”269 President Hoover called a special session of Congress to “mitigate the woes” of
farmers.270 This resulted in the discussion of a bill that would include increased tariffs on
agricultural products. The Republican majority in the House “crowded” the bill through and shut
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out the Democrats from any part in the decision-making process.271 “There was really little new
in this star-chamber process of formulating a tariff bill,” Michelson said, “but the secret sessions
were made to order for a hostile press bureau.” 272 Michelson then portrayed these secret sessions
of Republican congressmen to the American people as typical closeted off Republicans making
backroom deals with big business leaders. This reflected poorly on President Hoover as he had
called the special session. Hoover was then further criticized for indecisiveness regarding the
tariff bill. His credibility and “aura” completely fell away, leaving him open and vulnerable to
Michelson’s future attacks.273
Michelson flooded America with cartoons highlighting Hoover’s indecisiveness. When
Hoover ended up signing the tariff bill to please the men that he depended on for re-election,
protests began, which the Democratic publicity bureau happily egged on. Hoover made promises
of hope and prosperity during his 1928 campaign speeches. When Hoover was not making any
monumental strides towards a better economy in America, however, it was simple for Michelson
to turn the people against Hoover and broadcast the living reality instead of what Hoover had
promised.
In the months leading up to the election, Michelson consistently linked a Democratic
leader’s name to each news story for credibility. Wayne W. Parrish, reporter for Literary Digest,
wrote in 1934 that no matter what the Republicans did to try to get good publicity, “a Democrat
popped into the story somewhere.” 274 This led Republican leaders to accuse Michelson and
Shouse of creating “synthetic news” and called their work “infamous.” 275 When the Republican
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Party released a full-page newspaper advertisement slandering Raskob, Michelson wrote a
rebuttal statement for Raskob claiming the advertisement was a “reflection on his business
intelligence and integrity” and warned all newspapers who intended to publish the advertisement
in the future that he would hold them responsible for it. 276 The advertisement was not printed
again and “hastily withdrawn” by the Republicans. 277 Michelson claimed that with attempts like
this, the Republican Party sold themselves short with propaganda efforts in spite of themselves.
There was no credibility or anything political about their attacks, so all Michelson had to do was
craft a fierce and rapid response.
Michelson did not spend money excessively as publicity bureaus had done in the past. In
1932, the party with the smaller campaign fund won the election for the first time since 1916.
While both parties spent less money in 1932 than they did in 1928, the production of
promotional materials such as buttons and badges did not decrease. The 1932 election brought an
increase in expenditures when it came to moving picture advertising and the radio.278
Roosevelt took to the radio with many of his prepared speeches to attack Hoover on air
for the entire nation to hear. From his first opening campaign address, Roosevelt’s speeches and
addresses were broadcasted by a nation-wide network of stations. 279 Roosevelt inherited his
cousin Teddy’s knack for being able to smooth talk the press and sway the public in the Age of
Radio. In a radio address in July 1932, Roosevelt said that he hoped to use the radio “frequently”
about “important things that concern us all.” 280 The only downside to the radio was that now the
whole nation could tune in. Each speech had to be as original and powerful as the last. Together,
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with Michelson’s phrasing and Roosevelt’s charismatic manner, their mudslinging campaign
speeches helped pave the way towards the era of the radio.
***
Political ghostwriting dates back to America’s beginning when Alexander Hamilton
wrote George Washington’s farewell address. According to 1950’s ghostwriting expert J.
Douglas Knox, a talented ghostwriter knows his speaker, how he thinks, acts and expresses
himself. This was one of Michelson’s most important attributes as Roosevelt’s ghostwriter,
making Michelson a “top-flight” communicator. 281 Michelson attested that Roosevelt was a
“better phrasemaker” than anyone he ever had help him, but Michelson’s ability to insert “covert
digs” and “sly insinuations,” as Michelson himself put it, was unmatchable. 282
Roosevelt’s speeches included uplifting phrases such as “bold and humanitarian,”
“continuous responsibility,” “protection of children,” and “framed with an eye for actual human
needs,” to describe his platform and hopes for the nation. 283 His speeches also included phrases
such “destroyed the values of our commodities and products,” “crippled our banking system,”
“robbed millions of our people of their life savings,” and “thrown away the fruits of victory, thus
rejecting the greatest opportunity in the history to bring peace,” when describing the Republican
opposition.284
One of Roosevelt’s speeches in particular exhibited Michelson’s touch. In the
introduction of his speech Roosevelt says that he intends to discuss the Republican Party’s
policies and promises, which “to do so without severe criticism is impossible.” 285 Roosevelt goes
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on to say that destructive criticism is an unfortunate necessity, but to “build we must first clear
the ground.”286 Even when Roosevelt’s speeches were tearing down the opposition, he still
seemed to be the bigger man, carrying himself with dignity and class. The speech goes on to
blast the Hoover Administration. Roosevelt’s speeches against Hoover and the Republican Party
are remarkable in that no matter how critical they were or how dirty their accusations, the
speeches always left Roosevelt in a good light. Michelson was able to do this because he not
only attacked the policies of Hoover’s Administration, but also his character, which Michelson
denied doing throughout his life. He not only persuaded voters with the Democratic platform, but
he persuaded voters because he painted Hoover weak when Roosevelt strong, Hoover as a
coward when Roosevelt was courageous, and Hoover as deceitful when Roosevelt was righteous
and honest. While discussing issues such as economic failures of the Hoover Administration, the
speech reads: “The President hesitated, because he must have seen the awful nature of the
choice. But his courage failed.”287 Many of Roosevelt’s speeches had a similar theme. The
accusations and name calling continued throughout the election, but at no cost to Roosevelt and
his platform.
Michelson also wrote speeches for a number of other leading Democratic leaders. He
would write campaign addresses for them on Roosevelt’s behalf as well as editorials for the
papers signed by influential party leaders. Michelson always attached a name of importance to
newspaper articles so that the papers could not afford to toss it out, guaranteeing that it would be
published. Following Hoover’s official nomination acceptance speech, a meeting took place at
the Democratic national campaign headquarters where two dozen top Democratic leaders met for
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“strategy conferences.” 288 Just after, The Tampa Tribune reported that “from democratic ranks
today came a valley of challenges” as many Democratic leaders publicly expressed criticism of
the speech.289
Hoover’s speeches, Michelson recalled, were “largely statistical, claiming the depression
was over and electing Roosevelt would hinder any progress. 290 These speeches were lifeless and
boring compared to the vibrant and colorful speeches of Roosevelt and his supporters.
Democratic political leaders would often travel to Roosevelt’s home base of New York and
deliver exciting speeches to supportive crowds attacking Hoover as much as they supported
Roosevelt. Democratic leader Alfred E. Smith, who had originally been a 1932 contender, spoke
in New York and based his pro-Roosevelt speech on the basis of attacking Hoover, reemphasizing throughout the speech that Hoover was trying to scare the American public into reelection.291
A 1936 Saturday Evening Post article considered Michelson to be “the miracle man of
oratory.”292 He wrote speeches for countless numbers of Democratic politicians and while
Democrats appreciated Michelson and his work, the Republicans “made a sort of god out of hima malignant deity.”293 Michelson’s Republican opponents both admired and feared his work. His
ghostwriting was remarkable, and scary when on the other side. After his work on the 1932
election, he made “any number of Republicans believe in ghosts.” 294

“Democratic Leader Hits Hoover Talk: Robinson Speaks for Party in Criticism,” The Tampa Tribune, August 13,
1932, 1.
289
Ibid.
290
Michelson, The Ghost Talks, 40.
291
“Americans Not the Scared, Asserts Smith: Democratic Leader, in Speech At Troy, N.Y., Declared Faith in
Nation’s Future,” Oakland Tribune, November 3, 1932, 10.
292
Alva
Johnston, “Hundred-Tongued Charley: The Great Silent Orator,” Saturday Evening Post, May, 1936, 5.
293
Ibid.
294
“A Borrowed Myth, New York Times, January 18, 1933, 18.
288

69

***
In 1930, Frank R. Kent, writer for Scribner’s Magazine, wrote a popular article about
Charles Michelson and the devastation he caused the Hoover Administration. Kent’s intention
was to shed light on Michelson’s bureau, the agency that helped “mould the public mind” during
the election by “magnifying” Hoover’s misfortunes while “minimizing his achievements,” and
all around “making life miserable for him.” 295 While Kent’s article speaks unfavorably about
Michelson and his tactics, he considers Michelson’s work still to be a “remarkable performance,”
that illuminated the power of propaganda in “skilful hands.”296
In Herbert Hoover’s 1952 memoir, he devoted an entire chapter to defending himself
against Michelson’s attacks from many years before. Hoover attested that he had to go through
four years of personal attacks, and his writing shows that he continued to resent Michelson and
the campaign Michelson orchestrated decades after the election concluded. In an article Hoover
wrote for Collier’s Magazine twenty years after the election, Hoover claimed that the 1932
election demonstrated a “debut” of new political techniques including “the ‘abandonment’ of
facts, ‘irresponsible’ ghost writers, and also ‘blows below the belt.’” 297 When discussing these
new “techniques” in the article, Hoover wrote that they affected all future political campaigns to
come. Michelson had left Hoover mentally exhausted and one can assume when defeat came,
Hoover welcomed the opportunity to leave the spotlight. However, even Hoover could not deny
that the work Michelson did was unprecedented and noteworthy, with the effects of Michelson’s
work evident twenty years later in the words of Hoover, the target of the attacks himself.
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Five years after the election, in 1937, Michelson wrote an article titled, “My Advice to
the G.O.P.,” providing guidance on how to come up out of the ashes as a minority party who had
suffered defeat in previous years. Michelson wrote the article “not, of course from the standpoint
of propagandist for the majority party,” he said, “but merely as a political analyst of some
experience with at least a hypothetical knowledge of popular reactions.”298 Less than a decade
earlier, Michelson was part of the undertaking to reinvent the Democratic Party and in 1937, was
in a place to offer advice to the opposition. The article had a subtle condescending tone, and
Michelson probably jumped at the opportunity to remind Republicans how successful the
Democratic Party had recently become.
While in his autobiography Michelson blatantly called Hoover unfit, thin-skinned and
indecisive, Michelson claimed throughout his life that he and his bureau never published
personal attacks on Hoover. While Hoover was still reeling from the effects of Michelson’s work
on the 1932 campaign years later, Michelson never considered the work that he did to have been
nearly as impressive as other journalists and politicians of the time give him credit. Charles
Michelson, coiner of phrases such as “Hooverville,” played a critical role in reinventing the
Democratic Party and had a lasting impact on the campaign culture for presidential elections.
With the 2016 matchup between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, America seemed to
reach “an unprecedented low in mudslinging politics,” wrote Ron Grossman, reporter for the
Chicago Tribune.299 While the execution of political mudslinging may have evolved with new
technologies and available mediums, Charles Michelson set the stage in 1932 for campaigns to
be run with a central focus not only being the candidate, but the opposition as well.
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CONCLUSION: WHAT CAME AFTER
In modern elections, campaign advertisements flood our television screens. Mudslinging
against the opponent seems a necessary evil. A century ago, more present candidates evolved
into a candidate-centric style of campaigning contrasting the previous absent candidate and
party-centric campaign. This led to the necessity of new tactics and strategies to appeal to the
American people such as implemented by Woolley, Lasker and Michelson. What these men
pioneered took on greater proportions in later decades, making it easy to forget that in the early
twentieth century campaigning became more centered around in the candidate, tactical use of
modern technologies began to take form, the publicity bureau became a year-round, fullyfunctioning arm of the parties and the foundations for political advertising and mudslinging were
established by publicity experts.
The experiences of Woolley, Lasker and Michelson have often been lost as many
scholars focus on television as the time when publicity became critical for campaigns. David
Haven Blake, author of Liking Ike: Eisenhower, Advertising, and the Rise of Celebrity Politics,
wrote how television weakened the role of the parties and “turned politicians into performers,”
where candidates had to now “stage their appearances” for audiences far away. 300 This thesis
demonstrates that candidates became performers in the struggle for victory long before
Eisenhower. “Eisenhower agreed to the same set of promotional strategies that advertisers used
to sell products like laundry detergent and shaving cream,” Blake said, describing the way
Lasker had run Harding’s 1920 campaign. 301 Kathleen Hall Jameison in her book, Packaging the
Presidency: A History and Criticism of Presidential Campaign Advertising, claimed that, in
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1968, “for the first time,” the campaign advertising manager ran an “almost autonomous
operation.”302 In fact, while Lasker worked closely with Hays throughout the Harding campaign
and was hired from an outside agency, Lasker’s position as Harding’s advertising expert allowed
him to make autonomous decisions about the content that was created and disseminated, seeking
occasional approval from only Harding himself. Further, Gil Troy wrote that, by 1964,
Americans feared that the candidate was “simply another commodity being marketed,” another
concept not new to the decade. 303 Troy did credit Lasker with implementing advertising
“‘business’ principles” into campaigns that were carried on into 1964. 304
The advent of television did bring a transformation to campaigning. Television placed a
“new premium” on appearance. 305 The “gap between fact and fiction” continued to grow, and
Troy claimed that “personalities were more important than issues” and “impressions more
important than facts.”306 After Eisenhower’s use of television in the 1952 election, a common
claim is that with this election, for the first time, America saw the potential of “advertising,
entertainment and political consulting in presidential politics” and that his campaign “ushered in
the modern candidate-centered campaign.”307 Many believe that Richard Nixon’s sickly
appearance next to the handsome John F. Kennedy in the first televised debate was a factor in
Kennedy’s victory in the 1960 election. “It’s now common knowledge,” Kayla Webley for Time
Magazine said, “that without the nation’s first televised debate […] Kennedy would never have
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been president.”308 The television led to a greater emphasis on candidate-focused publicity as it
brought a new platform for candidates to campaign using established methods, but it did not
create it.
No technology medium thus far has “become infused into the political process with the
rapidity that social media has been.” 309 In the recent 2016 election, Donald Trump and Hillary
Clinton both took political mudslinging to an unprecedented level. Furthermore, the ability for
candidates to directly appeal to voters with their tailored message across a variety of platforms
continues to blend entertainment and information. More so in the 2016 election than ever before
America saw celebrity politics, campaign mudslinging and an amplified candidate-centric
campaign style.
***
Even at a time when America is at a peak in political polarization due to selective
exposure online, party leaders are not what determines election outcomes. The party-centric,
absent-candidate campaign style of 120 years ago has disappeared. In the most recent election,
Trump, the winning candidate, was not a selection of the party, and was in fact, a true celebrity.
The world of extravagant expectations that consumes Americans, laid out in Daniel Boorstin’s
The Image, has led to the entertaining style of modern campaigning. “The highlights of our
political history,” Greenberg said, “have often been consciously forged not by men of
impeccable virtue and purity of heart but by the careful and caring labors of speechwriters,
pollsters, image crafters, and other professional spinners.” 310 Publicity experts who run
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campaigns are historical figures, writing history with each new technique to fit the mold of
whatever new medium arises.
The work by these experts allows us to rethink the evolution of publicity in political
campaigns. Robert Woolley began the era of modern publicity experts with his structured
management and implementation of new techniques in a new candidate-centric era with new
mediums. Albert Lasker brought professional advertising into the world of political campaigning
which set the precedent for future campaigns. Charles Michelson successfully conducted one of
the biggest mudslinging campaign in history sullying Hoover’s name and depicting Roosevelt as
the savior America needed.
As the political parties started to lose their tight control over elections, publicity experts
slowly began gaining control. Today, candidates rely on such leaders to get them elected. While
modern political publicity techniques continue to evolve at an expedient rate with new
technological advancements and methods of outreach, the foundations for successful publicity
remain with the pioneers of the early-to-mid-1900’s.
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